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Abstract
Contemporary technology is contentious subject matter within the social sciences. It is
paradoxical, technology provides techniques and objects that serve humans in a positive
way, but at the same time it can destroy the environment and dehmnanize the labour
process. A significant aspect of analyzing technology and society is accounting for the
complex relationships that stand behind even the most mimdane technologies. Andrew
Feenberg seeks to account for this complexity with his critical theory of technology. The
critical theory of technology identifies capital as a determining force in the design and
function of technology. Revealing the influence of capital in apparent neutral
technologies allows Feenberg to develop a dialectical concept of technological rationality
that underscores the idea of a transformation of technological society to better reflect
more humanistic and environmental needs.
Within the critical theory of technology, Feenberg critiques another approach to
society and technology, actor-network theory. The purpose of this work is to examine
and compare the claims of both the critical theory of technology and actor-network theory
in order to examine how actor-network theory can complement the critical theory of
technology. This will be achieved by identifying a commonality that can be found in
both, the concept of society and technology combined as the sociotechnical. Within the
sociotechnical, the concept of power as explained by both theories will be re-interpreted
to illuminate how actor-network theory can complement the critical theory of technology.
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Chapter One - Technology & Complexity
1.1 Introduction
Technology has always been a contentious matter ia the social sciences. It can be viewed
as a tool that can help liberate the human race from toil and suffering by enabling people
to keep warm in the winter, refrigerate food, coinmiinicate over long distances, and
prevent health problems. It can also be seen as a tool that furthers unequal power
relations by reflecting the interests of the few at the expense of those whose lives are
structured by the use of technology^;
So far as decisions affecting our daily lives are concerned, political
democracy is largely overshadowed by the enormous power wielded
by the masters of technical systems: corporate and military leaders,
and professional associations of groups such as physicians and
engineers. They have far more to do with control over patterns
of urban growth, the design of dwellings and transportation systems,
the selection of innovations, our experience as employees, patients, and
consumers, than all the governmental institutions of our society put
together. (Feenberg 1995, p.3)

Technology effects everyone, yet those who are affected have little to no say in
the direction of technological innovation. Manufacturing, data processing, and
organizational technologies structure work relations Merarchicaiiy so that those who
actually use the technology have no influence in the design of it. Technological
innovation is responsible for pollution and environmental destruction, yet we as a
population camot transform the design of technology to lessen these harmful effects.
Every citizen deserves the right to influence the direction of technologies that affect their
lives and the environment in which they live. Minor regulatory changes do little to
address the larger problem of unequal participation, a single minded approach to
' For the purpose o f this work, technology will refer to the totality of materials used by humans that help to
create and maintain our contemporary technological society.
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efficiency, and a short sighted sense of the wide ranging effects of technological design
and implementation. This imdemocratic approach to technoiogica! design in our society
is a significant problem that needs to be addressed.
The difficulty of addressing these issues is made clear when one considers the
complexity that stands behind even the most ubiquitous technologies. Seemingly simple
actions often conceal complex patterns of interactions that stand behind each of those
actions. Nowhere is this more evident then in the relatively mundane exercise of
operating an automobile. The initial manufacture of a car involves negotiations between
labour unions and management, a Taylorist division of labour, and a capitalist system of
production and consumption. Knowledge of how to operate a vehicle and the rules of the
road are the immediate skills that must be embodied by the driver before he/she gets
behind the wheel. Registering the vehicle and the driver, purchasing an insurance policy,
and meeting the government’s standard of acceptable emissions all have to be
accomplished before one can legally drive an automobile. Once behind the wheel, the
engine, steering wheel, brakes and transmission all have to perform in a specific way in
order for the car to run. Using gasoline to power the vehicle is reliant upon another
complex array of interactions between oil producing countries, trade agreements, the
science of refining oil so that it can be used in an automobile, and the chain of retailers
who sell the gasoline. Mechanics, dealerships and service shops are all involved at one
point or another during the life of the car, extending the complexity. The people who
manufacture and service cars receive an income from this work that pays for a variety of
goods and services, provides financial security for their families, and through taxation
contributes to social programs. The effects of actually driving the car are recognized in
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scientific data that links the intemai combustion engine with harmfiil emissions that
damage our enviionment. The infrastructure of roads, necessary for actually driving from
one place to another, has destroyed countless acres of natural landscape.
Operating an apparently simple piece of technology like a car draws upon the
driver’s Imowledge, institutional and govemmental agencies, the laws of thermodynamics
and other feats of engineering ingenuity, trade relationships, refineries, a system of
exchange, Taylorism, the hole in the ozone layer, and the destruction of the natural
environment. What may appear to be simply a technological artefact, the car, is in
practise inseparable from driver’s education courses, OPEC, the Federal Ministry of
Transportation, trade tinions, mass consumption, and scientific journal articles. How are
we supposed to think about this complexity? By driving a car is someone implicated for
crimes against the environment? What about crimes against third world workers who
produce various bits and pieces of the car for unjust wages? The reality of living in a
society that is heavily mediated by technology - meaning that the lives we lead are made
possible only through the use of technology - is that we have to be aware of these
complexities if we wish to change technology and society for the better.
It is not plausible or realistic to simply insist that society regress to a period where
technological mediation is not as prevalent as it is today. Technology is not something
that can be approached by a ‘take it or leave if attitude. The detrimental and positive
aspects of technology exist simultaneously: Technological innovations provide long
distance communication, the opportunity to experience other cultures through global
transportation systems and the material infrastructure of our societies - but these same
technologies also pollute the environment and reproduce unequal power relationships.
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Solving the problems that are inherent in our modem technological society requires an
approach that recognizes the complexity of the interactions between society and
technology without resorting to Luddite tactics or attempting to flee technology’s
influence by escaping ‘back to nature’.
Andrew Feenberg recognizes both the complexity of our modem society and the
imdemocratic and unjust aspects of the technologies that surround us. Feenberg’s
systematic critique of contemporary technology. Transforming Technology: A Critical
Theory Revisited (2002), provides a basis for theorizing the radical transformation of
society and technology. The primary concept that Feenberg develops in Ms ‘critical
theory of technology’ (henceforth CTT) is the ‘technical code’, a means of identifying
specific social influences on technology. Feenberg uses this concept to trace the
dominant social characteristics that define technology and to foreground the complex
reiationsMp between social factors and technical elements that are found in teclmoiogy.
Technologies, according to Feenberg, are “more than a sum of their parts.. .they meet a
social criteria of purpose in the very selection of and arrangement of the elements from
which they are built up” (Feenberg 2002, p.78).
Feenberg’s critique is focused on contemporary capitalist society and the
technologies that have been developed within it. Harmful environmental and social
effects of technology are the result of the technical code of capitalism, a code that ensures
that technology meets the dominant social requirements of capitalism. The capitalist
technical code also enacts a distinct form of technological rationality that mirrors

capitalist rationality in regards to efficiency and organization. Capitalist technological
rationality also naturalizes a defmition of the essence of technology as inherently neutral
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and determined only by technological, and not social, requirements. Identifying the
technical code as the point at which technology is determined by the goals of capital is
also to identify the point at which technology is ‘ambivalent’ and can potentially be
transformed to meet the needs of a completely different society. Technology contains a
hidden dimension that is blocked by capitalist technological rationality and by
undertaking a ‘rational critique of rationalism’ Feenberg is able show that technology can
exist in multiple forms reflecting diverse social requirements. Using the technical code,
Feenberg is able to develop a concept of dialectical technological rationality that
identifies the potential of contemporary technology to meet more holistic and egalitarian
social and environmental requirements. Thus, the CTT provides a critique of our
capitalist technological society, without failing into the pessimism or fatalism of other
critical theories of technology, by providing a conceptual basis for positive technological
transformation.
The CTT is dismissive of critical approaches to technology that reflect
technological determinism. Technological determinism can be defined as the belief that
“in some sense technical change causes social change, indeed that it is the most important
cause of social change” (Mackenzie 1996, p.24). This type of critical approach to
technology can be found, to varying degrees, in the work of Ellul (1964), Heiibroner
(1967), and Winner (1986). Technological determinism subverts the CTT by negating
the potential for radical technological change. If technology does determine society, this
necessarily implies that the potential to transform technology to meet egalitarian and
environmental goals and embody different design standards is doomed because
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technology, and not influences externa! to teclmoiogy, determines modem society
(Feenberg 2002, p.138).
Within Transforming Technology, and in other works (Feenberg 2000; Feenberg
2003), Feenberg makes a significant effort to critique another approach to technology and
society, ‘actor-network theory’ (ANT hereafter). Feenberg contends that ANT is
incompatible with the critical theory of teclmoiogy because it contains “disturbing
normative implications” that derive from its specific analytical strategy (Feenberg 2002,
p.31). The goal of this work is to examine and compare the respective claims of
Feenberg’s theory and ANT. This opens up the possibility that ANT may provide
complementary insights to the critical theory of technology. The rest of this chapter
briefly introduces ANT and Feenberg’s critique of it, and then conclude with an
explanation of the approach that I will use to examine and compare these two approaches
in the body of this study.
1.2 Actor-Network Theory
Actor-network theory was developed within the sociological study o f scientific
knowledge (Latour & Woolgar 1979; Callon, Law & Rip 1986; Latour 1987). The
insights gained in these early studies were quickly applied to the study of technological
innovations that varied between the Electric Car in France (Callon 1986a; Gallon 1987),
the development of the TSR2 military aircraft in Britain (Law 1988; Law 2002a; Law &
Gallon 1988; Law & Callon 1992), and the study of the mundane technical objects that
make up our daily experience (Akrich 1992; Latour 1988a; Latour 1992).
ANT is a difficult body of work to summarize. Brown and Capdeviia (1999)
describe it as not a thing that circulates in an obvious and precise way (p. 29). Law
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(1997) contends that ANT can only be performed, and not summarised or told as a single
narrative. As a body of work, it changes as it is applied to different case studies. ^'Taat
ANT is then, is something that is constantly changing as it is applied in practise. ANT
attempts to comprehend the complexity of modem technological society, and like the
society that it attempts to describe, it cannot be reduced to a single, fixed point (Law
1999, p. 10). In order to overcome the inherent difficulty of describing what ANT is, this
work will focus primarily on the texts that originally introduced and explained the
specific methodological and theoretical insights of ANT. Although a number of different
concepts have been inteqected, questioned, excluded, or qualified in relation to ANT, to
address Feenberg’s critique of ANT it is best to rely on the works that provide the
original conception of ANT.
ANT examines technology and society by insisting that both are actually
networks of human and nonhuman bits and pieces. The example of the car at the
beginning of this chapter serves as an example of this approach. The car is not just a
specific technology that can be examined in isolation; it contains a number of networks
that mix humans, technologies, knowledge and politics. When the heterogeneous
interactions that stand behind the car are stable, they disappear, replaced only by the
action of driving a car. If these networks are not stable - the transmission fails, OPEC
institutes an oil embargo or a prolonged strike affects the supply and demand of cars - the
networks are exposed and the complexity is revealed.
A second postulate of the ANT approach is that an actor is the effect of the
networks that stand behind it. The simple car is therefore both an actor and a network.
Latour’s study of Pasteur (1988b) illustrates this feature by showing that the relatively
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simple idea of ‘Pasteur the great scientist’ was actually nothing more than the effect of
heterogeneous elements. This simple idea that is mythologized in history' books is
dependent on the laboratories, domesticated strains of bacteria, notebooks, statistics,
journalists, the French electorate and the sheep that Pasteur experimented on. These
complex networks combined to produce a single actor, Pasteur the great scientist. The
argument therefore is that outside of this heterogeneous network, Pasteur the great
scientist does not exist at all. Examining Pasteur in isolation from the materials that he
used provides a false interpretation of how Pasteur was able to achieve both his results
and his mythical status (at least in France). A single actor always represents, and is the
effect of, a network (Cation & Law 1997, p. 169). What is true of humans is also true of
technology. Gallon’s study of the attempt to develop an electric car in France (the VEL)
also reflects the idea that entities are effects of networked elements (Gallon 1986a; Gallon
1987). In order to develop and market an electric vehicle, the National French Utility
(EDF) that initiated and co-ordinated this project, needed to network more than the
technical elements of the VEL. A complex organization of laboratories, industrial
companies, municipalities and consumers also had to be successfully networked to
produce the VEL. Therefore, the technological artefact the VEL is in fact a network of
humans and nonhumans, a heterogeneous network.
Strategically, ANT applies an approach to the study of technology that is called
‘following the actors’^ through every process of network creation. ANT always
approaches the task of investigation empirically (Law 1992, p.387) in order to discover
the complexity of social and technical influences that combine to create technology. The
goal of this approach is to enter into the investigation of technology through the back^ Actors in this sense are not just human, but also technological actors.
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door of tedmoiogy-in-the-making - not throngh the more grandiose door of ready-madetechnology - in order to empirically understand the construction of both the technical and
social network examined (Latour 1987, p.4). The premise of this approach is to open the
‘black box’ of technology. The term ‘black box’ is a term that refers to any object that
contains a number of different elements organized as a complete whole. When many
elements are made to act as one, this is a black box (Latour 1987, p. 131). When
technology is black boxed, it can also be considered stabilized. The complex interactions
that make it up disappear and are replaced by the simple social and technological
perfonnance.
This insight leads to the next significant step in the ANT strategy: the assertion
that what is commonly referred to as the social is not purely social; but is made up of
heterogeneous materials. Of course, the social sciences have been aware of this for
centuries,^ but ANT takes this a step further by recognizing this in the process of
investigating the complexity that stands behind both the social and the technical. Often in
practise technology is bracketed off and assumed to have a status that is different from
humans. This leads to theories of determinism or neutrality because technology is seen as
passive, a resource or constraint that is activated by humans. An approach that is
premised on the idea that the social is materially heterogeneous must overcome this form
of asymmetrical analysis. ANT accomplishes this by identifying the role played by
nonhumaiis in the social order as being as significant as the role that humans play (Callon
& Law 1997, p. 168).

^ This insight can be traced back, at least, to Marx when he wrote, “what (humans) are, therefore, coincides
with what they produce, with what they produce and how they produce. The nature of individuals thus
depends on the material conditions which determine their production.” (Marx 1994, p.l08)
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ANT applies this postulate to contemporary socielyf by asserting that technology
is an effect of different human and nonhuman actors and that the form of these objects
will remain durable as long as the stable array of relations that make them up hold
together. Technology is a network that remains durable as long as every element stays in
place and the relations between these elements do not change (Law 2002b, p.93). An
example of both the relative durability and the variable trajectory of technology,
understood as a network, helps to illuminate this approach.
In Ms influential article Do Artifacts Have Politics, Langdon Winner (1986)
writes that renowned New York developer and urban planner Robert Moses intentionally
built low overpasses on Long Island (Moses’ influence was prominent from 1920-1970)
as a means to discourage the presence of buses on his parkways. One consequence of this
was that racial minorities and low-income families, the groups that primarily used the 12
foot high public buses, were unable to access Jones Beach, Moses’ widely acclaimed
public park. The public park, in accordance with Moses’ racist beliefs, was to be
accessed only by automobile-owning wMtes of the upper and comfortable middle class.
The result, according to Winner, is that many of the monumental structures, these bridges
in particular, erected by Moses embody a systematic social inequality that after a time
became a part of the landscape (Winner 1986, p.23). TMs attempt to create inequality by
employing material resources was successful, for a wMle. The network that Moses had
created was dependent on a number of diverse elements: relatively expensive
automobiles; social classes; racist beliefs, and, concrete bridges. Moses was successful in
creating a network that combined all of these elements in a durable network that secured
Ms racist beliefs. It would be easy to imply that technology, in this case automobiles and

10
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concrete bridges, determine social inequality. However, by understanding that the
desired effect of deliberately constructing low concrete bridges is also the effect of other
elements in the network, we can also understand how their durability as political objects
can change as the elements in the network change. Moses’ racial segregation depended
on the distinction between the private car and the public bus and the fact that during a
large part of the 20* century it required a large portion of the average income to maintain
a car. The concrete bridges were embedded with this interaction (and numerous others)
to reflect Moses’ desire for racial segregation and inequality. As the relative cost of cars
fell, an increasing portion of the classes that Moses hoped would not visit his park are
now able to buy and use cars to visit Jones beach. What was at one point a great division
cemented by technology became a technology that levelled the access to Jones beach
between all social classes (Law 1991a, p.176).
This example identifies the way humans and nonhumans can be combined in
intricate social and technical relationships. In this specific case, racism is exerted through
a technological network. This particular form of racism is overcome by the variable
trajectory of the elements that are juxtaposed in Moses’ network. The social is not purely
social and the technological is not purely technological. Both contribute and influence
each other in a continual process of interaction.
Feenberg critiques ANT on a number of different levels. He begins by attacking
the strategy of following the actors, or ‘transcendental localism’ (Feenberg 2002, p.30),
and the results garnered by this methodology. Feenberg dismisses the strategy of
following the actors in order to open the ‘black box’ of technology: “in practise no one is
interested in opening the black box of technology to see what is inside” (Feenberg 1995,

11
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p. 15). The theoretical implications of this strategy are also a problem for Feenberg. By
applying a strict operationalism that forbids the introduction of data that is not effective
or decisive in the organization of the network, ANT unknowingly applies normative
strictures that are incompatible with the CTT. Disturbing normative implications arise
because those that are oppressed by teclmological networks lose their voice, in the sense
that the Tosers’ perspective in any struggle disappears from view because it cannot be
accounted for in actor-network terms (Feenberg 2002, p.31). This mirrors the critique
that Hans Radder (1992) makes concerning ANT case studies, and in particular the study
of the Portuguese expansion into India by Law (1986a; 1987a; 19K7b). Radder makes a
plea similar to that of Feenberg: “from Law’s account of Portuguese colonial expansion
we learn a lot about the (ultimately) successful actors, but hardly anything about the
perspectives of the colonized inhabitants of Africa or India” (Radder 1992, p. 162).
TMs critique of the method employed by ANT leads to the next significant
problem that Feenberg identifies. ANT does not contain a plausible theory of opposition
to the capitalist control of technology. This is because it is humans, and only humans,
who can formulate demands based on reflexively examining the technical networks that
they are enrolled in. TMs reflexivity and subsequent demand for a technology that better
reflects egalitarian and democratic needs is solely human. On Feenberg’s interpretation
of the symmetrical treatment of humans and nonhumans found in ANT, the latter cannot
explain the ethical dimension of straggle and potential. For Feenberg, opposition and
straggle must include a theory of resistance that can oppose the present trend of technical
design and suggest an alternative. It is important to Feenberg to retain a strong sense of
radical potentiality from which to challenge existing designs. This potentiality is found

12
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in the persistent reference to alternative conceptions of nature and individnalit}' which
offer a basis for critiquing the totalitarian power of technology. Identifying social
conflicts and ills caused by technology enables the critical theory of technology to
identify potentialities that are hidden within modem technology. The task of the critical
theory of technology is to understand and articulate these potentialities in order to
advance a larger human cause on the basis of technology already in existence (Feenberg
2002, p.32-35).
1.3 Comparing CTT & ANT
As was stated earlier, the purpose of this work is to examine and compare these
approaches to technology. I believe the results of this comparison will generate an
analysis of ANT is that is compatible with the CTT. This rapprochement will be
achieved, first, by examining in detail both the CTT and ANT in Chapters Two and
Three, respectively. The examination of these two theories is organized by the goal of
understanding how both conceive of power in their theoretical understanding of
technology and society. Power to control the direction of technological design and
innovation, power to maintain stable relations between technology and society, and
power to change technology and society must all be accounted for in any examination of
technology. Chapter Two will examine the CTT and its concept of power embodied in
the technical code, by tracing Feenberg’s interpretation of the critical theory of Marx and
Marcuse. From these theorists, Feenberg develops the concept of the technical code, a
unique and valuable contribution to the critical study of contemporary technology.
Chapter Three will examine ANT in a similar vein, reviewing two significant
fields of study from which ANT draws its concept of power. These two fields of study

13
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are the ‘social construction of technology’ (Pinch & Bijker, 1984) and the ‘systems’
approach developed by historian Thomas P. Hughes (Hughes 1979; Hughes 1983;
Hughes 1988). ANT models power through the concept of ‘transiationh a theoretical
model of power that differentiates ANT from the ‘social constructivist’ and ‘systems’
approaches. As a conception of powep ‘translation’ differs significantly from other
theories by viewing power not as the cause of social and technical action, but rather as an
effect of social and material associations (Latour 1986)'^.
The conclusion of this work constractively addresses the critiques that Feenberg
makes of ANT. Accomplishing this task will first require the identification of the
common ground of both theories: the idea of the ‘sociotechnicar. By conceiving of
society and technology as one complex whole instead of impractically separating the two
for analysis, both ANT and the CTT mirror one another’s belief that “the technology we
are currently endowed with could, in another world, be different” (Law & Bijker 1992a,
p.7-8). Taking this shared conception of a sociotechnical world as a point of departure
for both theories allows both to employ an analysis of the process of ‘translation’, and
both to contribute to identifying the actual point at which the ‘technical code’ is applied
in practise. ‘Translation’ emerges as a concept that can serve as a means to identify, not
only how capitalism encodes technology, but also the ambivalence of teclmoiogy, and its
potential to be re-encoded with the emancipatory values and requirements of a different
social system.

Unpacking the concept o f translation within the context o f this work requires extensive preparatory
discussion and will be the burden of Chapter 3.

14
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Chapter Two -The Critical Theory of Technology

TMs chapter examines the CTT with an emphasis on FeenbergM conception of power,
operationalized in the concept of the teclmicai code, in contemporary technological
society. The encoding of technology with specific social requirements results in a
distinct form of technological rationality that can be discovered by utilizing the concept
of the teclmicai code. In our specific social system, capita! determines not only the design
and function of technology, but also the form of rationality that guides the design process.
This can be overcome, though. By identifying the technical code of capitalism in modem
technology, Feenberg is able to isolate and critique capitalist technological rationality.
Defining capitalist technological rationality as premised on the decontextualization of
technology from its social and environmental contexts, Feenberg provides an alternative
conception of technological rationality that is characterized by a movement “through
reification to reintegration” (Feenberg 2002, p. 183). A socialist technical code would
recontextualize technology with environmental and social dimensions that are ignored
under the technical code of capitalism. The idea of a socialist technical code and an
accompanying radical transformation of technology should not be understood as utopian
fantasy. Contemporary technology contains the elements that would be needed for this
transformation and it is a matter of identifying the point at which technology is encoded
that serves as the basis for this transformation.
The technical code provides a concept of power in technological society that
recognizes the complexity inherent within it. It is not a matter simply of destroying
technology developed within a capitalist society for the purpose of encouraging positive
social change. The technical code of capitalism identifies power as residing importantly

15
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with those who determiae the form and fimction of technology, not those whose lives are
structured by technology. To discover the point at which technological rationality
influences technologicai design decisions that reproduce this social inequality is to
discover the point at which social change can be realized without reverting to senseless
destraction. Contemporary teclmoiogy is thus dialectical. It contains within it the pow'er
for environmental and social domination and the potential to overcome these aspects and
reflect a more socially and environmentally responsible set of social requirements.
The purpose of examining technology as dialectical is to combine essentialist
insights into the technical orientation towards the world with critical and constructivist
insights into the social nature of technology. Technology contains within it not only a
decontextualized orientation towards pre-established goals, but also integrative potentials
that can take into account the environmental and social effects of technology. Feenberg
contends that this dialectical concept of technology breaks with the negative evaluation of
technology found in Frankfurt School critical social theory, but also reflects the goal of
critical theory to search for a positive moment in modernity that can overcome the
disaster of modernity (Feenberg 2002, p. 176).
The path that Feenberg follows in his development of the concept of the technical
code within the CTT is primarily influenced by the work of Marx and Marcuse^.
Understanding how Feenberg uses the insights of these theorists to develop the concept of
the technical code and the critical theory of technology is the purpose of this chapter.
Section one wit! examine the influence of Marx’s work on the critical theory of

^ Within the context of this work, the works o f Marcuse and Marx will be limited to their influence on the
CTT. Although both theorists, primarily Marcuse, composed a great number o f works that critically
approached technology and society and these insights can potentially be contrasted with Feenberg’s
interpretation of them, this work deals exclusively with the influence of Marx and Marcuse on the CTT.
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teclmoiogy and will explain the concept of ‘ambivalence’ that Feenberg develops based
on Marx’s insights. Section two will examine the influence of Marcuse on the CTT.
Marcuse’s influence emerges into view in the concepts of the technical code and
dialectical technological rationality. Section three will then summarise how Feenberg
utilizes the technical code to account for a specific form of technological power in
contemporary society.
2.1 Marx & The Ambivalence of Technology
The numerous writings that Marx completed contain a number of different approaches to
technology. Because of this it is best to assume that Marx’s position on technology is
ambiguous at best, with a number of different theories and approaches to technology
finding support within Ms writings (Feenberg 2002, p.45-6; see also Mackenzie 1996).
Feenberg’s goal is not to produce a definitive account of Marx’s views; rather he seeks to
examine these various positions as they appear or are attributed to Marx in order to derive
concepts and approaches that can contribute to a critical theory of technology capable of
addressing contemporary concerns (Feenberg 2002, p.46).
Feenberg injects the insights of Marx into the CTT by identifying Marxism as the
first theory to unmask the connection between capitalism and technology. Feenberg
argues that Marxism, despite tMs insight, was unable to create a complete socialist
politics of technological transformation. “As a critique of capitalism, Marxism shows
that politics and technology are inextricably linked, but its concept of socialism fails to
take that coimection into account” (Feenberg 2002, p.37). Employing a model of the
transition to socialism with separate political and technological phases of transition
accounts for tMs failure.
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Feenberg writes that despite the diverse number of approaches to technology that
Maix took in Ms witings, he never succumbed to the same fate that Nedd Ludd did by
limiting Ms critique to the ‘bad use’ of machinery® (Feenberg 2002, p.45). Feenberg
interprets the critique of the ‘bad use’ of technology to refer to three problems; 1) what
purposes particular technologies are employed to accomplish; 2) how they are employed,
and; 3) the way in wMch technical principles are employed in the design of technology
(Feenberg 2002, p.45-46). In order to identify the specific aspect of the critical theory of
technology that resonates with Marx’s writings, Feenberg examines the three critiques
mentioned above in order to derive the concept of ‘technological ambivalence’, the
CTT’s debt to Marx.
The first of these bad uses of technology is the ‘product critique’ that derives from
attacking the purpose of technology. This approach focuses exclusively on the ends that
technology serves under capitalism while approving of the means. It is neither the
technique nor the tool that requires transformation because if the political organization of
society is transformed then technology will necessarily reflect this change. Hence, the
product critique regards technology as a neutral tool. TMs view is found in positions that
examine technology as an element of the base of society and not inherently predisposed
to embody class interests. TMs position is not a full account of Marx’s position though,
as support can be found for another position, the ‘process critique’, that reflects the
critique of the way in which technology is employed. Marx frequently attacked the
capitalistic employment of technology for causing widespread social and environmental
^ In Capital Vol.I, for example, Marx writes that the Luddite movement was responsible for the “largescale destruction o f machinery.” This approach to technology was successfully overcome by “both time
and experience” with the result that “the workers leamt to distinguish between machinery and its
employment by capital, and therefore to transfer their attacks from the material instruments o f production to
the form o f society which utilizes those instruments” (Marx 1977, p.545-555).
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ills. Hanning the soil to extract maximum agricultural yields and failing to safeguard the
health of the workers can be traced to the capitalist employment of technology (Marx
1977, pp.517-544). The process critique takes into consideration the noa-technica!
effects of the technological production process and contends that this process is therefore
not merely a means to an end, but creates an enviromnent for the working population^
(Feenberg 2002, p.46).
A Marxist approach to technology that is based on the abolition of capitalist
property relations, a greater emphasis on the health and safety of the workers and a
greater concern for the natural environment mirrors the product and process critique of
technology. The problem with this approach, according to Feenberg, is that technology
cannot be transformed and democratized through merely a formal change in the
ownership of technology because the technological inheritance is specifically adapted to
hierarchical control. Undemocratic aspects of capitalist technology that reproduce the
capitalist division of labour also need to be transformed, a goal that is incompatible with
solely changing the control of contemporary technology or introducing reformative
change based on safety or health concerns (Feenberg 2002, p.51).
Feenberg finds a third critique of technology in Marx that overcomes this problem
and is reflected in the CTT. This is the ‘design critique of technology’, an approach that
identifies the combination of technologicai means and social imperatives. By referring to
a specific passage in Capital, Vol.l, Feenberg is able to show that Marx’s work contains a
critique of the social purpose of technological design. “Machinery ...is the most powerful
weapon for suppressing strikes... It would be possible to write a whole history of
inventions made since 1830 for the sole purpose of providing capital with weapons
See Jones (1996) for an example of this type o f critique.
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against working class revolt” (Marx 1977, p.563). This passage asserts that technology is
shaped in its design and development by the social purposes of capitalism, and in
particular by the need to maintain a division of labour that keeps the labour force safely
under control. The CTT is able to derive the concept of technological “ambivalence” by
interpreting this particular aspect of Marx and finding support in his work that
“technology is a dependent variable in the social system, shaped to a purpose by the
dominant class, and subject to reshaping to new purposes under a new hegemony”
(Feenberg 2002, p.48).
The ‘ambivalence of technology’ is the concept Feenberg uses to identify the
actual base of technological transformation within contemporary technology.
Technology developed within a capitalist system reflects the social requirements of
capitalism. These requirements are introduced at some point during the design process.
To identify the point at which these requirements are embedded in technological design is
to identify the point at which technology is ambivalent towards a number of different
social systems.
The Marxist conception of the transition to socialism needs to incorporate both
the political and technological base that it inherits from capitalism®. Focusing exclusively
on technology, the concept of ambivalence concerns not the different ends that can be
served by the existing technology, but what new technological means it may produce.
Technology can be reshaped as machines developed under capitalism are employed to

®Feenberg admits that emphasising technology and politics equally within a transformation to socialism
cam ot be qualified as Marxist in the usual sense and will be greeted with scepticism by Marxists who turn
to political economy for the serious business of social critique. However, “an exclusive emphasis on
political economy tends to overestimate the rationality and coherence o f capitalist strategies and
underestimates the significance of resistances, innovations, and reforms in every domain except class
struggle, where, unfortunately, there is little to report” (Feenberg 2002, p.23).

20

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

produce a new generation of macMnes adapted to socialist purposes (Feenberg 2002,
p.53). The theory of ambivalence serves as a source of resolution between political
realism and utopia by,
identifying the raw material of socialism among the inheritances
of capitalism. It asserts the possibility of bootstrapping from
capitalism to socialism. As far as technology is concerned, it is
difficult to imagine an alternative to an ambivalent process of change.
A whole new technology cannot spring pure from the sweaty brow
of the proletariat as Athena did from Zeus’s forehead. (Feenberg 2002,
p.53)
According to Feenberg, the Marxist conception of the transition to socialism fails
to take into consideration the connection between capitalist technology and the transition
to socialism because it relies on a two-phase conception of the transition to socialism.
The “two-phase” conception of the transition became significant during the late 19*
century when socialist parties rationalized moderate strategies of short term reform in the
present while holding out for the ‘purely rhetorical promises’ of the utopian “higher
phase of socialism” (Feenberg 2002, p.39). A theory of the ambivalent employment of
the technological inheritance of capitalism cannot be found in the work of Marx because
this would be achieved in the higher phase of transition to socialism. As a result of this,
Marx’s concept of the transition to socialism lacks a connection between the theory of the
socialist state in the first phase of socialism and a theory of the transcendence of the
division of mental and menial labour in the higher phase of socialism (Feenberg 2002,
p.59).
This problem can be seen in the product and process critique of technology. The
notion that the transition to socialism can be accomplished by changing who controls
technology and by introducing measures that limit detrimental health and environmental
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effects does not overcome the capitalist division of labour. Although these reformative
aspects of technology reflect the first stage of the transition to socialism, it is essentia! to
also incorporate, at the same time, the higher phase of the transition to socialism, the end
of the capitalist division of labour. Socialist emancipation cannot be accomplished by
implementing the policies, no matter how socialist, of those who simply inherit the
technological base of capitalism. Every such person then finds themselves in the exact
position formerly held by the capitalist, obliged to use the same means of repression to
extract labour power from an unwilling working class (Feenberg 2002, p.60). The two
phases of socialism, reinterpreted to mean from Feenberg’s perspective, political
transformation in the first phase and technological transformation in the second phase,
reflects a theoretical tension in Marx’s concept of technology and transition^. Feenberg
presents an alternative conception of the transition by condensing the two phases into an
extended period of “democratic struggle over technology and administration” with the
aim of democratizing the power base of capitalist technology at the same time as
democratizing the administrative and governmental power base of capitalism (Feenberg
2002, p.60-61). This new approach to the transition to socialism can only be
accomplished by applying a critical theory of technology that recognizes and incorporates
the ambivalence of technology at all levels of transition.
2.2 Marcuse - The Technical Code & Dialectical Technological Rationality
Feenberg’s integration of Marxism into the critical theory of technology is necessary in
accounting for the relationship between technology and society. Reducing technology to
®Feenberg uses the example o f the USSR to show how a state can be trapped between socialist ideology
and capitalist heritage. The Soviets were unable to carry out socialism properly because they replicated the
control aspects o f capitalist technology. The Socialist regime could only implement policies where these
were compatible with capitalist technology, thus confirming Feeaberg’s thesis that socialism cannot be
imposed by transforming law and government administration alone (Feenberg 2002, p.60).
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an instrmnental tool*® results in an incomplete concept of both social and technical
transformation. The design critique of technology and the ambivalence of technolog}^ are
based on the idea that technologies contain social and technical functions. The design
critique explains how technology is influenced by social and not strictly technological,
imperatives. The theory of ambivalence asserts that technologies influenced by social
factors are subject to social change. Incorporating Marx’s notion of the potential for a
transition to socialism by using the technological means at hand necessitates a radical
alternative to instrumental Marxist theories of technology (Feenberg 2002, p.63-4). This
is accomplished by utilizing the insights of Marcuse’s critique of technological rationality
and reconceptualizing these insights into a theory of technological power that recognizes
a dialectical concept of technological rationality.
Defining technology as having two dimensions that reflect differing
interpretations of technological rationality allows Feenberg to identify the basis of
technological and social change within the critical theory of technology. “Once
rationalit>’ is treated as a social phenomenon, its concrete sociological forms are open to
study” (Feenberg 2002, p.67). The CTT seeks to undertake a ‘rational critique of
rationality’ to isolate the dominant form of technological rationality, in order to show that
this is only one possible form of rationality amongst others (Feenberg 2002, p.69).

“ By rejecting technology as an instrumental tool, Feenberg also rejects the notion o f instmmentai
rationality. This idea is essential to a critical theory o f technology that attempts to overcome the inherent
problems of contemporary technology, primarily the capitalist division o f labour and top-down control.
This insight can be linked back to the work o f Marcuse who examined the historical development o f reason
and technological rationality and how this came to be the logic of domination (Marcuse 1964, p.l23).
Marcuse’s insight that, “the science o f nature develops under the technological a priori which projects
nature as a potential instrumentality, stuff of control and organization. And the apprehension o f nature as
(hypothetical) instmmentalitj' precedes the development o f ail particular technical organization” (Marcuse
1964, p.l53) is the conclusion that Feenberg uses to critique mstmmental conceptions of technology.
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The CTT attacks capitalism by attacking its forms of rationality. In order to
critique the apparent neutrality of capitalist technology, the CTT must undermine the
standard of rationalit}' that defines it (Feenberg 2002, p. 163-165). The design critique of
technology and theory of ambivalence found in Marxism relate the values embodied in
technology to a social hegemony, “but what depends on a social force can be changed by
another social force - technology is not destiny” (Feenberg 2002, p.64). Feenberg
associates this concept with the work of Marcuse, whose work is one of the most
significant approaches to modem forms of domination that “treated technology as an
expression of the historical development of the dominant paradigm of rationality”
(Feenberg 2002, p.64-5).
Marcuse begins this task by clearly identifying the bias that exists in modern
capitalist technological societies. “Scientific-technical rationality and manipulation are
welded together into new forms of social control. Can one rest content with the
assumption that this unscientific outcome is the result of a specific societal application of
science?” (Marcuse 1964, p. 146) Both Marcuse and Feenberg identify this feature of
modem society and argue that because technology concentrates power in the hands of the
few, it should be subject to the same critique that Marx applied to the market. “Like
market rationality, technological rationality constitutes the basis for elite control of
society.. .This control is not simply an extrinsic purpose served by neutral systems and
machines but is internal to their very structure” (Feenberg 2002, p.66).
Feenberg’s concept of capitalist technological rationality is dependent on the
connection that Marcuse makes between formal universal rationality and domination.
Formal rationality imposes a universality that abstracts from the whole, not towards its
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potentiality, but rather towards its form. “Rationality here calls for unconditional
compliance and coordination, and consequently, the truth values related to this rationality
imply the subordination of thought to pre-given external standards” (Marcuse 1941,
p. 147). The result of this is that technology is pre-disposed to meet capitalist standards of
efficiency and organization at the expense of a potential transcendent reality that
technology could mediate. This form of technological rationality also infiltrates the
attitudes of the people of capitalist technological society by dissolving “all actions into a
sequence of semi-spontaneous reactions to prescribed mechanical norms (that is) not only
perfectly rational but also reasonable” (Marcuse 1941, p. 143).
Formal universals decontextualize their objects from their social and natural
contexts across both time and space. “Instead of transcending the given towards its
essential potentialities, this type of universality classifies or quantifies objects in terms of
the function that they can be made to serve in an instrumental system imposed on them
from without.. .Formal reason is biased toward the actual, what is already realized and
available for technical control” (Feenberg 2002, p. 169). This bias appears in technology
through the inability of those who design and standardize technology to grasp the history
and social contexts within the process of technological innovation and development.
Technology can only be used and adapted for social domination, not transformed to
reflect the realization of the potentialities in the context of a different society (Feenberg
2002, p. 169).
Despite Marcuse’s influential insights toward a critical theory of technology,
Feenberg finds it difficult to recognize in Marcuse a complete critical theory of
technology that provides an alternative conception of technological rationality.
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Marcuse’s theory offers no basis for understanding how the dominated might avoid
domination, how to block the inevitable one-dimensionality of capitalist technological
rationality. Marcuse seems to admit that all forms of resistance can be absorbed by
capitalism. Offering an analysis that differs from Marx’s original insights concerning the
relationship between capitalism and the society, Maicuse correctly identifies a feature of
contemporary capitalism that was not obvious in Marx’s time. Capitalism no longer
offers minimal compensation for alienation and misery; it delivers the goods like never
before to a working class that is incorporated into the system (Marcuse 1989, p.227).
Marcuse’s critical theory of technology ends at an impasse by describing the system of
capitalism as an unbroken chain that is formed by authoritarian management, technology
adapted to its needs, and a ready supply of consumer goods. Opposition to this system is
virtually non-existent and thus “the theory subverts itself by cancelling the idea of
transcending action and appears to reinstate the fatalism of a Heidegger or Ellul”
(Feenberg 2002, p.72).
The textual evidence that Feenberg uses to come to this conclusion can be found
in the preface to One-Dimensional Man. Feenberg contends that Marcuse wavers in his
critical approach to technological society because as Marcuse writes, “advanced
industrial society is capable of containing qualitative change for the foreseeable future”
(Marcuse 1964, p.xv). Although forces exist that may break this containment, the power
of advanced industrial society is dominant. Faced with this impasse, Marcuse suggests
that perhaps only a catastrophic accident may alter the situation (Marcuse 1964, p.xv; see
also Feenberg 2002, p.72).

26

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Feenberg seeks to preserve the essential insights of Marcuse by axguing that his
critical insights lack a theory of technological hegemony capable of explaining in detail
the connection between technology and rationality. By providing a theory of
technological hegemony, Feenberg is able to offer a dialectical concept of technology that
reflects the need to transcend contemporaiy social and technical arrangements with an
alternative form of technological rationality. Avoiding the fatalism of Marcuse requires a
theory of hegemonic mediations responsible for the problems that he appears to blame on
technology (Feenberg 2002, p.74). This is accomplished through the development of the
concept of the ‘technical code’. The technical code is Feenberg’s means of explaining
technological power in contemporary society.
Utilizing the work of Marcuse, Feenberg builds up to the concept of the technical
code by introducing a ‘dual aspect’ theory of ideology/technology. This concept treats
hegemonic and cognitive fonctions as reciprocal aspects of one underlying source. In this
case that single source is capitalism. Both the social power of capital, and technical
knowledge, expressed through capitalist technological rationality, are integrated in a
concept of social and technical power. To grasp this concept involves an examination of
the function of rationality in modem hegemonies. An effective and determining
hegemony is one that is not imposed by force through a continuing struggle between
resistant agents and a system. To succeed, a hegemonic system of rationality should be
reproduced unreflectively by the standard beliefs and practises of the society that it
dominates. For the centuries that pre-dated the rise of capitalism, religion and tradition
exercised the role of hegemonic power in this way. Today, forms of rationality supply the
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hegemonic beliefs and practises that were at one time provided by the church and the
community (Feenberg 2002, p.75).
Capitalism is unique in that its hegemony is largely based on reproducing its
power through technical decisions. This argument can be traced to the difference
between pre-capitalist and capitalist relations of production. In pre-capitalist societies,
the labour process was enveloped in regulations and responsibilities stemming from the
ownership of tools and the formation of natural communities based on skill and need.
Capitalism frees itself from these limitations by building workforces and markets out of
atomized individuals. Refusing to recognize aspects of social organization based on
traditional or communitarian ideals, the capitalist has a great deal more freedom of action.
Feenberg calls this freedom of action the capitalist’s “operational autonomy”. All
strategies imposed from the position of the capitalist must reproduce his/her operational
autonomy at the expense of other potential strategies that would reflect different concerns
and interests. Operational autonomy is not a property of individuals per se, it is the
property of the capitalist organization of the technological elements of society (Feenberg
2002, p.75-76).
Capitalism works to preserve and expand its operational autonomy and this goal is
gradually incorporated into the standardization of procedures and artefacts that establish a
framework in which daily technical activity serves the interests of capitalism.
Capitalist social and technical requirements are condensed in a
“technological rationality” or a “regime of truth” that brings the
construction and interpretation of technical systems into conformity
with the requirements of a system of domination. I will call this
phenomenon the social code of technology or, more briefly, the
technical code of capitalism. Capitalist hegemony, on this account,
is an effect of its code. (Feenberg 2002, p.76)
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The technical code of capitalism is not just the rale that guides technical choices.
It also exists as a form of technological rationality and logic that ensures the preservation
of the capitalist’s operational autonomy. In order to exist, organizations must encode
their technological base by binding technology to hegemonic social requirements. This is
accomplished in the design stage of technology. Technological innovations are built up
from tangible technical elements - springs, levers, gears, etc. These elements are placed
together to create a technological artefact. Technology, during the design process, is
decontextuaiized from its social context and encoded with the social requirements of
capitalism. These requirements reflect and impose a system of top down control before
they are socially contextualized in actual practise.
An example of this encoding can be found in Smythe’s (1973) description of
television technology, which he argues is specifically suited for a capitalist system:
Existing TV techniques had been developed under capitalism to
make possible the sale of motion pictures and other commodities
to people in their homes. At the time when TV was developed in
capitalist countries it would have been possible to design a two-way
system in which each receiver would have the capability to provide
either a voice or voice-and-picture response to the broadcasting
station. But for its purposes, capitalism needed only a one-way
system and this is what was developed. (Smythe 1973, p.231-232).
The technical code of capitalism identifies a process of technological invention
that is not entirely determined by technical means. Decontextuaiized technologies are
encoded to meet social constraints. Thus, a complete definition of technology employing
the technical code includes the idea that technologies are more than a sum of their parts;
they also embody a social purpose in the very selection and arrangement of technical
elements from which they are built.
The embodiment of specific purposes is achieved through the “fit”
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of the tecimoiogy and its social environment. The technical ideas
combined in the technology are relatively neutral, but one can
trace in it the impress of a mesh of social determination that preconstruct a domain of social activity in accordance with certain
interests or values. (Feenberg 2002, p.78)
The technical code of capitalism can be defined as the general rule for correlating
the social and the technical into a single technological artefact. The ambivalence of
technology can be found when one descends towards the foundation of technoiogical
development and discovers relatively ambiguous technical elements that can serve a
number of social purposes. Identifying the ambivalence of technology supports the
notion that the technical code is the primary source of power in modem technological
societies. “A technical code is needed to bind technological applications to hegemonic
purposes since technique can be integrated to several different hegemonic orders. This is
also why new technologies can threaten the hegemony of the ruling groups until it has
been encoded” (Feenberg 2002, p.79).
By applying a dual aspect approach to technological rationality, the idea that
knowledge and power are two effects of a single source, the relation between technical
knowledge and society is made clearer. Introducing a terminology that solves the
problem of critiquing knowledge/rationality as a projection of social power without
reverting to fatalism or determinism is achieved by identifying the connection between
technology and social hegemony. The technical code is a means of understanding how
both of these factors are co-ordinated in technological application (Feenberg 2002, p.80).
To remedy his critique of Marcuse that his theory does not present a theory of
resistance to dominant forms of technoiogical rationality - Feenberg constructs a concept
of dialectical technical rationality. This feature of the CTT again makes use of Marcuse’s
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theof}" of teclmological ratioaality, but also identifies the transcendent potential of
contemporary technology by identifying the means at hand that can influence positive
change.
The CTT depends on a distinction between what Feenberg calls ‘primary’ and
‘secondary’ instrumentaiizations of technology (Feenberg 2002, p. 175). The first of
these, the primary instnmentalizations of technology, mirrors Marcuse’s critique of
formal technological rationality. Technological rationality is predisposed to
decontextualize the technical object from its immediate social context and thus impels
technology towards its immediate use and not its potentiality. Feenberg details the
moments of primary instrumentalization in the separation of the technical object from its
immediate context; in the reduction of all technical objects and the subjects who use them
to their useful aspects; and in the protection of the technical object and not its subjects
from the immediate and long-term consequences of technical action (Feenberg 2002,
p.178-183).
Because technology is not simply an orientation toward the world, recognizing
only the primary instrumentalization of technology neglects the social and environmental
context of technoiogical use. Feenberg identifies and contrasts the moments of secondary
instrumentalization. Instead of separating the technical object from its immediate
context, secondary instrumentalization proposes that technology be reintegrated with
humans and nature. Instead of reducing objects to their useful aspects, aesthetic and
ethical qualities can be incorporated into their design. Instead of separating the technical
object from its immediate consequences, human users can. democratically decide the
future and fate of their societies by examining the use and immediate and long-term
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effects of technology (Feenberg 2002, p.178-183). The description of the car used in the
introductory chapter can serve as an example of this approach. Accounting for the
secondary instrumentaiizations of the car would require designers, manufacturers and
consumers to recognize the complexities that stand behind the car and attempt to account
for these. Instead, most people understand the car as simply a primary
instrumentalization and concern themselves with its performance and how it serves pre
existing immediate needs.
The theory of the secondary instrumentalization of technology is a theory of the
way in which “the skeletal primary instrumentalization takes on body and weight in
actual devices and systems in a social context” (Feenberg 2002, p. 175). Technology
contains both the decontextualizing primary instnimentalizations and the integrative
secondary instrumentaiizations. Although in practise these levels are inseparable,
Feenberg identifies them as analytically distinguishable by arguing that technology is
dialectical. In this sense, technology can be understood as oriented towards an existing
reality, or it can be understood as a tool that can potentially liberate humankind by
influencing its design and use towards an as yet unfulfilled transcendent reality. A full
account of technology must include the secondary instramentalizations of technology
denied at the primary level. The CTT, by employing instrumentalization theory, is able to
identify the technological resources at hand that realize the potential for technological
transformation (Feenberg 2002, p. 176). “The dialectics of technology is thus not a
mysterious ‘new concept of reason’ but an ordinal}^ aspect of the technical sphere,
familiar to all who work with machines” (Feenberg 2002, p. 177).
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2.3 The Critical Theory of Technology
The CTT and its concepts of the technical code and the ambivalence of technology
provide an account of technological power that seeks to identify why technology takes
the form that it does. The technical code of capitalism is applied to contemporary
technology to detemiine its function and form. Capitalist hegemony does not rely on a
particular technique of social control, but more fundamentally on the technical
reconstruction of the entire field of social relations within which it operates (Feenberg
2002, p.183). This fact not only applies to capitalism, it applies to any hegemonic force.
Feenberg uses the instrumentalization theory of technology to provide a model of
socialism based on a socialist technical code. A socialist technical code would emphasise
the reintegration of the secondary instrumentaiizations of capitalist technology.
Ecological, medical, aesthetic, urban planning, and democratic considerations that the
capitalist technical code regards as problems external to the process of technological
design and use would be reintegrated as engineering objectives into a more humane and
environmental responsible technology determined by a socialist technical code (Feenberg
2002, p. 183-184).
This is the potential that is embodied in contemporary technology, but the reality
of teclmological society is quite different than this conception. Technology takes the
form that it does because capital enacts oppressive relationships through the secondary
instrumentaiizations of technology. Because capitalist hegemony is dependent on a
specific form of technological rationality, it reduces technology to its primary
instrumentalization to produce a form of technical rationality that is based on
decontextuaiization, calculation and control. The result of this is that the definition of
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technology is reduced to include only this primar}' instmmentalization and other aspects
and effects of wide-spread technoiogical mediation are suppressed by relegation to non
technical concerns (Feenberg 2002, p. 177).
The dialectical concept of technology is blocked by the capitalist technical code.
The need to incorporate the social requirements of capital into technological design is
recognized and carried out by the technical code of capitalism. This code creates
technologies that reproduce capitalist power by employing fragmentation,
decontextuaiization, and the capitalist division of labour. The technical code also forms a
type of universal knowledge defined by a specific foma of technological rationality.
Together, these social and technical elements determine a form of technology that is
based on top-down control and results in environmental and social problems that cannot
be solved in the current social or technical order. Capitalism determines knowledge of
what technology is, in a manner that blocks any attempt to reintegrate the secondary
instmmentalization of tecimoiogy.
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Chapter 3 -- Aetor-Mefwork Theory
The previous chapter detailed the approach that Feenberg takes to technology by
examining the concepts of ambivalence and the technical code with the CTT. This theory
and its elements contain a definiti ve reason why contemporary technology exists as it
does. Capitalism determines the form and function of technology by encoding it v/ith a
capitalist technical code that ensures both the technical and social requirements of
capitalism are embodied in teclmological artefacts. The technical code not only
determines the form and function of technology, it also blocks the inherent potentiality of
current technology to meet more humane and environmental requirements by naturalizing
a narrow definition of technological rationality. This chapter seeks to examine ANT in
order to identify its concept of power: ‘translation’. Deployment of the concept of
translation does not explicitly seek to answer why technology takes the form that it does;
rather, it seeks to identify how the social and technical remain durable and expand over
time and space.
Before examining ‘translation’ as a concept of power, it is important to examine
ANT in more detail. Examining ANT in this context will entail tracing the influence of
two similar approaches to technology that ANT reflects: social constructivism (Pinch &
Bijker 1984) and the systems approach of Thomas P. Hughes (1979; 1983; 1988). The
point of this digression is twofold: first, it introduces and accounts, from within the field
of society and technology studies, the specific methodological and theoretical principles
of ANT; and second, it details the theoretical background that provides the point of
departure for the concept of translation as it is developed within the actor-network
approach.
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3.1 The Social Constructivist Position: Pinch & Bilker’s Contribution
Deriving from the sociology of science and the sociology of tecimoiogy, social
constructivism has influenced the growing field of technological studies

In an

influential article, Pinch & Bijker (1984) lay the groundwork for this approach by
synthesizing the empirical programme of relativism (EPOR) found in the sociology of
science and early attempts of applying a social construction of technology (SCOT) model
(Finch & Bijker 1984, p.400).
The EPOR is an approach that has demonstrated the social construction of
scientific knowledge in the ‘hard sciences’. This approach is best known as the strong
programme approach of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK).*^ Unique to this
approach is the focus on the empirical study of contemporary scientific discoveries and
innovation, and in particular the controversies that arise during the process of closure that
concludes these debates. This approach to science is premised on the understanding that
scientific knowledge is as contestable as other forms of knowledge. In order to
understand how it is that specific types of scientific knowledge are taken to be true one
examines elements external to science itself that may be responsible for the growth of
particular forms of scientific knowledge. This approach can be grasped quickly with the
aid of Pinch & Bijker, who identify three successive stages in the explanatory aims of
EPOR: interpretive flexibility, closure mechanisms and the relation of the closure

“ For the sake o f brevity I will only examine the claims made by Pinch & Bijker (1984); for a review of
other works in this field see Bijker, Hughes & Pinch (1987) and Pinch (1988).
This approach is best acquainted with the Edinburgh school of the sociology o f scientific knowledge
(SSK). This approach to the sociology o f scientific knowledge adheres to the following principles; 1) It
should be concerned with the conditions which bring about belief or states of knowledge; 2) It is impartial
with respect to truth and falsity, rationality and irrationality, success or failure. Both sides o f these
dichotomies require explanation; 3) It should be symmetrical in its style o f explanation - the same types of
cause would explain true and false beliefs (the principle of symmetry), and; 4) It should be reflexive. Its
patterns o f explanation would have to be applicable to sociology itself (Bloor 1976 [1991], p.7).

36

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

mechanisms to the wider socio-cultural environmeiit. The interpretive flexibility of
scientific facts is displayed by showing that scientific findings are open to more than one
interpretation. Multiple interpretations are quickly eliminated by a scientific consensus
as to what the truth is in any particular instance; this represents the closuie, or
stabilization mechanisms of EPOR. The third aspect, the impact of these closure
mechanisms on the wider social environment, had yet to be carried through in any study
of the contemporary sciences. EPOR is a part of the effort to study and understand the
content of the natural sciences and scientific knowledge in terms of social construction by
studying the closure mechanisms used to create consensus amongst controversy (Pinch &
Bijker 1984, p.409-410).
In SCOT, turning from science to technology, the developmental and stabilization
processes of a specific technology is described as multi-directional. In historical
hindsight (using a technological deterniinist or neutralist position) it is easy to collapse
the process of technological development into a simple linear model^^, but this would
miss the primacy of approaching these stages of technological development as not being
the only possible ones. If the multi-directional model is applied it is possible to
investigate why some designs fail while others succeed, thereby exposing more clearly
the interpretive flexibility of tecimoiogy (Pinch & Bijker 1984, p.411). In this model the
defining role is played by social groups that are concerned with the technology itself. For
it is the social groups concerned with the development of a technological artefact who
decide which problems are relevant. The meaning given to any particular technical
object is only achieved when a problem is defined and answered by a specific social
Pinch & Bijker describe the linear model o f technological development as occurring in six consecutive
stages: Basic research, applied research, technological development, product development, production and
usage (Pinch & Bijker 1984, p.405).
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groHp. These soda! groups can subsequently be further broken down and defined: for
example Pinch & Bijker in describing the development of the bicycle find it necessary to
break down the social group ‘cyclists’ into separate social groups of ‘female cyclists’ and
‘sport cyclists’, each having specific interests. For example, sport cyclists who raced
bicycles had specific problems that needed to be solved (speed). These problems differed
from the problems identified by female cyclists who were concerned primarily with
m a in t.3.in in g

a certain level of modesty while riding the bicycle. The goal of this is to

have a detailed description of all the relevant social groups in order to better define the
function of the artefact with respect to each group (Pinch & Bijker 1984, p.414-415).
The identification of the relevant social groups and their interests exposes a number of
conflicts: conflicting technical requirements, conflicting solutions to the same problem,
and moral conflicts. This model does not merely describe the development of technology
as a linear process, it highlights the multi-directional character of such developments as
well as revealing the interpretive flexibility of technology and the role that different
closure mechanisms may play in the stabilization of any specific technology (Pinch &
Bijker 1984, p.419).
Thus, Pinch & Bijker describe an integrated approach to the social constraction of
technology by emphasizing three important aspects of the synthesis between SCOT and
EPOR. ‘Interpretative flexibility’ emphasizes the point that technology is culturally and
socially constracted and interpreted as well as implying that the design process itself is
flexible - there is not one possible or best way to design a technical object (Finch &
Bijker 1984, p.421). When dealing with technology, the process of stabilization or the
closure of debate surrounding a technological artefact is best understood by analyzing the

38

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

stabilization of the artefact across a number of social groups, by interpreting the closure
mechanism. Pinch & Bijker describe two such mechanisms: rhetorical closure and
closure by redefinition of the probiem'"^. Both mechanisms can appeal to the interests of
the relevant social groups and it is those social groups who determine the final form of
the technology in question (Pinch & Bijker 1984, pp.424-428). Examination of the
relevant social groups also appears to lead to a conclusive decision concerning the third
aspect of this synthesis, attempting to understand the relation of a technological artefact
to the larger socio-cultural environment. By focusing on the meaning attributed to a
technological artefact by a specific social group it is possible to trace this meaning to a
larger socio-cultural or political situation which may influence the meaning given to an
object. In this way, the social constructivist model of understanding technological
development and stabilization seems to offer an account of the operationalization of the
relationship between the larger socio-cultural context and the content of technology
(Pinch & Bijker 1984, p.428-429).
The similarities between ANT and the social constructivist approach are many:
the inherent interpretive flexibility of the technological artefact itself, a dismissal of the
linear mode! of technological development, and an emphasis on empirically analyzing all
of the actors that influence the technology in question. However, ANT does differ from
the social constructivist perspective in a number of key ways that, when taken together,
help to reveal ANT as a distinct and unique approach to analyzing technology, separate
from the social constructivist approach.

*'* Rhetorical closure refers to the method by which the relevant social groups propose the technical
problem be solved. Advertising can play an important role in this process. The other possible means of
closure, closure by redefinition of the problem, means redefining the key problem with respect to how the
artefact is the solution.
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The most significant point of departure for ANT on this matter is a disagreement
with what Law refers to as sociai reductionism, the view that it is social factors and social
factors alone that explain the growth of technological systems (Law' 1987b, p.229).
Sociai rediictionism as an explanatory strategy tends towards the assumption that stable
social factors lie behind and outside the technology and direct its evolution. These social
factors are taken to be unchanging, and consequently, are left substantially unanalysed
(Law 1987b, p.230). The alternative to this position is to adopt a position in which social
factors are not privileged and to undertalce the investigation of technology with a view
that social factors are not the sole determining force in technological development'^.
Rather, the actor-network approach works out the implications of assuming that the
stability and form of technological artefacts “should be seen as a flinctiori of the
interaction of heterogeneous elements (both sociai and technical) as these are shaped and
assimilated into a network” (Law 1987a, p. 113).
The second significant difference in the ANT approach follows the first in
questioning the social reductionism of social constructivism. By undertaking a study that
follows the actors or technological system builders (Law uses the term ‘heterogeneous
engineers’), ANT understands these system builders to be constructing simultaneously
the sociai and the technical, the ‘sociotechnical’ (Law 1987b, p.231; see also Cation &
Law 1989; Law & Cation 1988). The actor-netwwk approach finds that social interests
do not stand outside and behind technological development; rather, they are created in
much the same way that the technology is created. A way to understand this is to adopt
the analytical principle of generalized agnosticism (Gallon 1986b, p.200) that eliminates
See Gallon & Law (1982) for an example of how social interests are not to be seen as backgroimd factors
but as attempts to defke and enforce the institutions, groups or organizations that exist from time to time in
the social world.
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the need to refer to macro-social categories by examining these categories as an effect of
micro-level interaction:
The force of our traditional sociological view obviously depends
entirely upon the notion that the professional sociologist has a more
warrantable account of social interests than those whom he or she
studies and that expressions by actors of their own interests or those
of others must at best be seen as data for the hidden version of events
that is visible only to the sociologist.. .The role of (ANT) becomes that
of discovering the methods by which actors and collectives articulate
conceptions of the natural and social world and attempt to impose these
on others and the extent to which such attempts are met with success (Law
1986b, p.3)

The best way to clearly show these differences is to revisit the case study
mentioned in Chapter 1, the development of the electric car (VEL) in France. This project
was first presented by a group of engineers working for EDF (Electricite de France - the
public electricity utility in France) in the early 1970’s. The genesis of this project was an
evaluation of the trajectory of the development of different electrochemical batteries
created by EDF engineers (Gallon 1987, p.85). Their predictions and conclusions showed
that properly developed lead accumulators can be used in public transportation until
1982. The year 1982 will mark the beginning of zinc/nickel accumulators and the
zinc/air circulation generator allowing top speeds of 90 Km/h. In 1990 the fuel cell will
be available, based on the trajectory already in place, for use in all publicly and privately
owned vehicles (Gallon & Latour 1981, p.288). Of equal importance in this project was
the redefinition of French society by EDF as a, “society of post-industrial consumers who
were grappling with new social movements. The motorcar occupied a position that was
highly exposed, for it formed a part of a world that was under attack” (Gallon 1987,
p.85). The EDF determined a specific history of French society and defined what was
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coming next: the all-out consumption of the post-war years is doomed. The direction of
future production must take into account the happiness and quality of life of the French
people. In this way, the EDF placed the history and evolution of French industrial and
consumption society as a whole in a ‘black box’*®(Gallon & Latour 1981, p.287). The
sociai factors that were important were isolated and made significant, along with the
technology itself, in a proposed sociotechnical network.
The EDF also redefined Renault, the leading automobile manufacturer in France
and a leader of European industry, by depicting their role in this society as simply the
manufacturer of the new chassis and car bodies. Renault will no longer be a powerful
com pany.

It will be reduced to the level of a modest company that has limited

participation in assembling the VEL (Gallon 1987, p.86). As well, the federal
government, as defined by the EDF, will be responsible for enlisting different ministries
to subsidize municipalities that show interest in developing electric public transportation.
Municipal governments were depicted as solely city councils whose task it was to
develop a public transportation system that does not increase the level of pollution
(Gallon 1987, p.94). The technical elements that were needed to run the VEL were
determined: the zinc/air accumulators, lead accumulators and fuel cells with their
associated entities including catalysts and electrons. These technical elements were not
given in the order of things; they were determined previously by the group of engineers
working on energy conversion*^ (Gallon 1987, p.86).

See Chapter 1 for an explanation o f the term ‘black box’. In this case a black box is a collection of
disorderly and unreliable entities that form into an organized whole. When many elements are made to act
as one, it is a black box (Latour 1987, p. 131). See also Whitley (1972) for further discussion o f the‘black
box’ theory in the sociology o f science.
See Gallon (1981) for a detailed study o f how multiple interpretations o f what constituted a fuel cell were
negotiated and stabilized into a working black box that was to become known as the developmental model
for the fuel cell and subsequently the VEL.
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The EDF had black boxed, or in the language of Cailon, simplified, complex
netmwks into workable and manageable actors. Social factors in this case were not seen
as standing outside and behind the technolog}/' itself; the society that was needed in order
for the VEL to be successful was created and simplified in much the same way that the
technological specifications were. The VEL, if successful, would be a black box that
contained a number of other black boxes, reiterating what Cation & Latour (1981) believe
to be true of macro-structures: “Macro-actors are just micro-actors seated on top of many
(leaky) black boxes” (p. 286). By qualifying the black boxes as leaky. Gallon and Latour
are rephrasing what Law (1992) believes to be trae of all macro-structures, that for a
time, if they perform and act as a single block^^, the complex networks that make them up
disappear; but, all punctualization and simplification is precarious and any macrostructure can degenerate into a failing network (p.385). This is exactly what happened to
the VEL: instead of maintaining the proposed simplification process, the world was
rendered more complex by stigmatizing the reality created by the EDF (Gallon 1987,
p.94).

The black boxes that the VEL was seated upon were opened by the concerted
efforts of Renault and by the unpredictable behaviour of the defined technical and social
actors. These actors were not satisfied, or did not perform, the role that they had been
given in the sociotechnical scenario proposed by the EDF. Renault attempted the task of
de-associating all the association made by the EDF. Each interaction was tested and
every calculation redone in order to open all the black boxes proposed by the EDF
If a network is seen as a single block, or an actor, it is pimctiialized according to the terminology o f ANT.
Network relations that are widely performed are those that can be punctualized. For example, the
traditional automobile is a punctualized network o f relations because the complexity of interactions
between pistons, transmission, oil exporting countries, financing options and the infrastructure o f roads is
masked in the performance o f this particular network (Law 1992, p.385).
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(Cailon & Latour 1981, p.291). Renault successfully showed, by collecting and
interpreting data and redefining the results that EDF constructed, that the EDF prediction
of a post-industrial age was simply a minor problem that could be overcome. The sociai
criticism levelled at the traditional car was not as drastic as EDF claimed it w^as; instead,
it was simply temporary and local dissatisfaction with the car industry’s lack of
dynamism and the poor state of public transportation. In the three years since the project
was first proposed, the protest movement had dissipated, recession was looming large and
a greater focus was needed for reindustrialization, not a move towards post
industrialization (Gallon 1987, p.97). Renault also questioned the technology of the VEL
by showing that the zinc/air accumulators were a shaky venture lauded by only a handful
of researchers whose loyalty was with the EDF. As well, Renault introduced the fact that
if the VEL was to become the standard of transportation in France the entire national
infrastructure of service stations would need to be transformed into stations where used
electrolytes could be changed periodically. Renault proposed a gloomy future of
uncertain strategies and conflicting interests between industrial groups in contrast to the
idealized world of the EDF (Cailon 1987, p.91).
Here we can clearly see the differences between the actor-network approach and
social constructivism. Whereas social constructivism examines the interests of social
groups as the determining factor in the development and closure of a technological
artefact, ANT proposes that we should analyse how these social interests are both
constructed and juxtaposed with other entities in the network. For the VEL to be
successful, the post-industrial society that was predicted by the EDF engineers is just as
important as the successful working of the technical elements that make up the zinc/air
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accumulators. Social interests and technical logistics are constructed and placed in a
network simultaneously so that the network of social interests and the network of
technical elements combine into a sociotechnical network that does not privilege either
social or technical factors.
Taken a step farther, ANT argues against essentiaiism of any kind by assuming,
prior to empirical investigation, that nothing is given in the order of things, including
macro-social structures that may influence the design or evolution of technology. This is
termed Telational materiality’ by Law (1999): the understanding that entities have no
inherent or essential qualities, but take their form and acquire their attributes as a result of

interaction with other entities. The result of this is that all divisions (big or small, agency
or stracture, truth and falsehood) between entities, prior to investigation, are dismissed. If
such divisions or distinctions exist, they should be seen as an effect or outcome of
interaction (p.3).
If it appears that a macro-structure determines the outcome of technological
design, the question then should be: How was this actor able to grow to be a macrostructure? And, more importantly what processes and materials assist in this growth?
This is the study of ‘translationk No actor can maintain power over another, in the ANT
view, except by means of translation (Callon & Latour 1981, p.280-281). For EDF to
grow over time and space, and subsequently for Renault to shrink, the predicted and pre
defined interactions between techni cal and social entities proposed by EDF would have to
hold. Renault is not by nature a large and powerful corporation; it achieved this position
by networking countless simplified entities. The way in which these entities are made to
hold their place in this, or any, sociotechnical network is through translation. Translation
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is the way in which one actor is able to make all other actors go through it in order to
achieve its goals.
3.2 The Systems Approach to Technology; The Seamless Web
ANT takes, according to Callon, the systems-inspired analysis and insights of Thomas P.
Hughes one step further (Gallon 1987, p.101). In his seminal study of Edison and the
electrification of America (Hughes 1979; Hughes 1983) Hughes adopts a systems
metaphor to explain the rise of technological development, innovation and
implementation. Key to Hughes’ analysis is the notion of the ‘seamless web’, an idea
that arose through following the historical records of Edison. Hughes discovered that
importance should be given, not to the inventor exclusively, but also to the evolution of
the total system of production. In his study of Edison, Hughes is careful to explain the
importance of individuals such as Samuel Insull and S.Z. Mitchell^® as well as the
materials available at Menlo Park as equal parts in the same system:
The availability of these varied talents helps explain the encompassing
character of Edison’s concept of a system. Furthermore, they were
supported by a broad array of expensive machine tools, chemical
apparatus, library resources, scientific instruments, and electrical
equipment in the Menlo Park laboratory complex (Hughes 1979, p.l29).
It was not just people and materials that were inserted into the seamless web but
also the traditional categories of social science demarcation. Following the systems
builders themselves (following the actors), Hughes finds that they “were no respecters of
knowledge categories or professional boundaries... Edison so thoroughly mixed matters
com m only labelled ‘economic’, ‘technical’ and ‘scientific’ that his thoughts composed a

Samuel Insull was a “manager-enfrepreneur” who developed the Chicago Edison Company’s system of
electric light in the later period o f the electrification of America; Mitchell was the “fmanciai-entrepreneur”
o f the later period who introduced financial and organizational means by which the growth o f utility
systems might continue from regional levels to one national level (Hughes 1979).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

seamless web” (Hughes 1988, p. 13). “Edison’s method of invention and development in
the case of the electric light system was a blend of economics, technology and
science.. .In Ms notebooks pages of economic calculations are mixed with pages reporting
experimental data, and among these one encounters reasoned explications and hypothesis
formulation based on science - the web is seamless” (Hughes 1979, p.l35).
If one follows the actors, according to Hughes, one invariably finds it difficult to
differentiate elements along the established lines of categorical interpretation. Instead,
diverse elements (economics, politics, science, journalism, technology, etc.) join together
into a system where one element is indistinguishable from the rest of the other elements.
Thus, Hughes implies that the technological system of electrification was a sociotechnical
system in which the social cannot be seen as lying beMnd and directing the technology.
Neither can the technology be seen as lying behind and directing the social; rather, the
sociotechnical influences the sociotechnical (Law 1987c, p.418).
The similarities between Hughes’ approach and ANT are quite obvious: an
emphasis on the sociotecluiical as opposed to solely the social, technical, political or
economic factors of technical development, and empirically focused studies of the
systems builders themselves in order to generate the sociotechnical conclusion. The
significant difference between the two approaches is the emphasis that ANT places upon
conflict within the network. As the above example of the VEL shows, large scale
heterogeneous engineering is difficult. Elements in the network continually prove
difficult to tame, and thus vigilance and surveillance (via actors of varying durability) has
to be maintained. It is the belief of the actor-network approach that actors will almost
always fall out of line and that there is always some degree of divergence between what
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the elements of a network would do if left on their own and what they are obliged,
encouraged or forced to do when they are enrolled in a network (Lav/ 1987a, p.l 14).
This insight leads to two important aspects of ANT unaccounted for in Hughes’
approach. First, ANT proposes that the relationship between the actors and the network
is reciprocal. An actor-network is simultaneously an actor who whose activity is
networking heterogeneous elements and a network that is able to redefine and transform
what it is made of. Instead of viewing the network as linking in a predictable fashion all
those elements that are perfectly defined and stable, ANT proposes that the entities of
which an actor-network is composed could at anytime introduce new elements that
change the network (Callon 1987, p.93). Under the terminology of ANT then, network
does not mean transport without deformation; instead it reflects a series of mutual
transformations (Latour 1999, p. 15).
Secondly, and more importantly, is the notion o f ‘generalized symmetry’
proposed by ANT. Symmetry, as was stated earlier (see footnote 10), was a concept
developed within SSK to account equally for the existence of scientific beliefs, both false
and true. This concept is taken a step further by ANT. If all entities are actor-networks
involved in sociotechnical arrangements, and within these actor-networks and
sociotechnical arrangements there is no difference, in kind, between the human and nonhuman elements, then it makes sense to adopt a vocabulary that treats the social, natural
and technical with the same vocabulaiy, to not “change registers when we move from the
technical to the social aspects of the problem studied” (Callon 1986b, p.200).
This move by ANT has been the subject of much debate^® and therefore I find it
necessary to qualify this position w th a simple argument that explains the position of
See the debate between Collins & Yearly (1992) & Gallon & Latour (1992).
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generalized symmetry. When one speaks of the ‘social order’, what is one speaking
about? It cannot simply be the social, for without materials and associations of non
humans and humans the human social order would resemble the social order of baboons
and there would be no explanation for the solid, durable macro-structures that we see
forming everywhere in human society (Callon & Latour 1981, p.283).
The somatic - the resources of the body - though these are already
heterogeneous, are altogether inadequate to generate the kinds of
social effects that we witness round about us. For orderings spread,
or (sometimes) seek to spread, across time and space. But, and this
is the problem, left to their own devices human actions and words
do not spread very far at all. The conclusion is inescapable. Other
materials, such as texts and technologies, surely form a crucial part
of any ordering. (Law' 1994, p.24)
This problem of accounting for nonhuman actors is inherent within sociology and
social analysis. Latour (1992) declares that sociologists are always looking for social
links that are sturdy enough to tie us ail together or for moral laws that would be
inflexible enough to make us behave properly. Unfortunately, the society that is being
recomposed with bodies and norms is constantly crumbling. The remedy to this is
ultimately equality between the human and nonhuman during the process of social
investigation (Latour 1992, p.236). Generalized symmetry is not anti-human, it is the
ultimate extension of methodological equality within sociotechnical networks. If ANT is
prepared to apply this principle of equality, then it must be prepared to apply it without
fear or favour (Lee & Brown 1994, p.776).
3 3 Translation
ANT, departing from social constructivism and systems theory through the use of
generalized symmetry, generalized agnosticism, and relational materiality, presents a new
form of analysis to the study of power in sociotechnical orders and specifically the role
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played by technology in structuring power relationships: the study of translation (Callon
1986b, p. 197). Translation, at its core, is the study of power in the sociotechnical world
described by the actor-network perspective.
In this sense, power is not a cause of action. Power is always an effect of
associations between heterogeneous elements. Latour (1986) breaks wdth sociological
tradition and contends that within this definition of power, society should not be seen as a
structure that holds everything together. Rather, society it is what is held together
through associations of humans and materials and the effect of these associations is that
some manage to maintain power and some do not (p.276). Latour uses the example of an
office manager to show how power is an effect of the resources surrounding this person.
In this case, power is an effect generated by walls, record keeping, clothes and machines.
Power does not reside in the position the manager holds, it resides in the materials that
create his position (p.276).
Another example will help clarify this notion of power. The example of Robert
Moses and his racist bridge designs found in Chapter One provides an example of how
power, and the reversal of this power, is an effect of associations and not a cause. The
inability of poor inner-city citizens to access Jones Beach was not caused by Moses’
racism. It was the effect of Moses’ racism, cement bridges, expensive automobiles, and
10 foot high public buses. The association of these elements led to the effect that poor
urban citizens were not able to access Jones beach. Similarly, the shift in power, the
ability to access the beach by those who w^ere initially barred, was also an effect. The
desire to overcome the racist structures that Moses built did not cause their demise.
Rather, the effect of relatively inexpensive means to own an automobile in combination
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with roads already in existence resulted in the effect that the power relationship that
existed previously was changed.
Problematization
The first step (or strategy) of translation is problematization, or how to become
indispensable by making oneself an ‘obligatory passage point’ - a point which all entities
must go through if they are to achieve their goal. To do this, a sociotechnical scenario
must be created that determines a set of actors and defines their identities in such a way
as to establish themselves as an obligatory passage point in the network of relationships
that they are building. Problematization touches on a number of elements - social, natural
and technical - and describes a system of alliances or associations between entities
defining what they want (Callon 1986b, p.203-206). This is the first part of translation,
creating a situation in which actors are dependent on you to get what they want.
In the case of the VEL, the EDF proposed a sociotechnical scenario in which they
would become the obligatory passage point for a number of different actors with the
explicit goal of enrolling these actors in their proposed network. The EDF says to its
users (government and consumers): If you want to solve your pollution problem we must
create an electric vehicle. If we want to build an electric vehicle we must first solve the
problem of the short life of the electrochemical power sources needed for this vehicle. If
the electric vehicle is to be successful you must agree with the social and technical
definition that we propose (Callon 1986a, p.26-27). Problematization is thus a strategy of
translation. This strategy creates a situation where potential users of the VEL consider
their future and their values as passing through the EDF via problematization. As was
stated above, the EDF not only determined the precise characteristics of the VEL, but
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also the social universe in wMch the vehicle would function. The EDF defined the roles
of the actors and proposed a scenario in w'Mcii these actors would define each other.
By identifying French society as urban, post-industrial and coming to terms with
the changing landscape of transportation (iiifliienced by new social movements aiming to
improve the country by putting science and technology at the service of the user), the
EDF defined a social and technological history for the VEL to develop in. They also
defined the CGE (Compaignie Generate d’Electricite) as the company that would develop
electric motors and batteries. Renault will produce the bodies of the VEL. The
government will be responsible for formulating regulations favourable to the VEL
including subsidies for municipalities interested in electric transportation. Lead
accumulators, zinc/air accumulators, and fuel ceils - in that successive order - are also
defined as the key technical elements. In sum, the EDF has created a network in which
numerous actors are defined by simply proposing a solution to pollution and traffic
congestion that also matched the changing attitudes amongst French society towards
status driven consumption and ecological responsibility. The EDF puts forward a list of
entities and a list of what they do, think, want and experience.
This is not all that is accomplished through problematization. The relative size of
actors is also determined. In the network proposed by EDF, Renault is no longer a major
European manufacturer of cars and it will never regain that status. The relative status of
lobby groups who act on behalf of the automobile and oil business are also reduced.
Social movements who demand that technology serve the needs of the user instead of
out-dated profit interests grow to gain much more influence (Callon 1986a, p.20-23).
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Probiematization makes it possible to describe both the contents of tecimical
objects and theoretical knowledge without bias. A concise investigation of this
technological innovation requires that the electrons, consumers, government ministries,
Renault and social movements must all be accounted for. None of the entities can be
placed in a hierarchy, or be distinguished according to its nature, as the absence of one
entity would lead to a breakdown of the whole. The proposed VEL sociotechnical
scenario is the result of heterogeneous engineering (Law 1986a), and cannot be
understood unless considering all the elements that equally contribute to its development
(Gallon 1986a, p.23).
Enrolment
The network proposed by EDF is simply that, a proposal. The actual construction of the
VEL needs much more than defined identities and roles of the actors. The EDF needs to
construct this network by enrolling the actors in their defined roles so that they cannot be
defined in other networks and they cannot envision their identity other than that of the
definition proposed by EDF. Enrolment is essential for both the development of the VEL
and for the EDF to become an obligatory passage point for all the actors identified during
probiematization. In this sense enrolment is the series of negotiations, trials of strength
and tricks used to ensure the successful translation of the entities in the EDF’s network
(Callon 1986b, p.211). This is the point at which the EDF failed to realize their proposed
network and instead Renault redefined their own successful network.
The enrolment of some actors does not need to be negotiated. Some actors
willingly accept their enrolment without resistance. This would be the case for
environmentally conscious consumers and potential users of the VEL. Some actors need
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other, more durable, means to ensure their successM enrolment. Renault, for a brief
time, was forced into the EDF’s network through scientific knowledge and social
analysis. The facts that were presentee! by EDF were indisputable. In a post-1968
France, the social universe that EDF proposed and the VEL represented seemed
inevitable. For three years nobody interrupted the progress of the EDF. Renault did not
possess knowledge that even considered the dynamics of electrochemistry so they were
forced to abide by their defined role in the EDF’s network. Faced with the prospect of
becoming a smaller and less powerful company, Renault attempted to enrol scientific
knowledge via research laboratories and social analysis via statistics that countered the
claims of EDF’s engineers. Using the terminology of ANT and translation, Renault
resisted enrolment and countered by attempting to define and enrol entities in their own
network.
Renault was able to use statistics to show that despite an increase in gas prices,
demand for the conventional automobile increased. These facts proved to be dissociable
in practise and Renault translated social desires differently than EDF. People will always
want private automobiles that take into consideration the speed, comfort and acceleration
that the VEL will never have (Gallon & Latour 1981, p.290). This translation of social
desires and the evolution of the social world proved to be more durable in practise than
the future the EDF proposed. Instead of seeing a social demand for a completely new
system of transportation, Renault translated the data that it had collected and came up
with different results. French consumers will not adhere to their new role as mature,
ecologically responsible members of a post-industrial society. Instead they are content to
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seek social distinction, comfort and speed via the conventional car (Law & Moi 1995,
p.284).
Successfully dissociating the social translations, Renault focused on the technical
knowledge being used by EDF. Research laboratories were hired and the knowledge
produced within these institutes showed that the calculations and experiments by EDF to
develop the VEL were wrong. The proposed trajectory of the evolution of the electric
engine (lead accumulators, zinc/air accumulators, fuel cells) was wrong. Unfortunately
for EDF (or fortunately for Renault) the specific elements of the actual engine in progress
did not need to be scrutinized by other networks. They proved to be difficult and
eventually impossible to enrol because the catalysts refused to play their part in the
scenario developed by the EDF, also rendering the trajectory of fuel cell development
unusable (Callon 1987, p.91).
The EDF failed to make itself an obligatory passage point because it could not
enrol all of the actors defined in their proposed network. Renault, on the other hand, was
able to enrol the actors and therefore translate them into a whole, making itself an
obligatory passage point for a significant portion of the transportation system in France
and Europe.
As shown in this example, the process of translating actors is difficult and
precarious. Using the concepts and language used by ANT suggests an interesting
method for the study of technology and society by creating a way to understand how it is
that macro-stractures are able to exist amidst the complex number of actors enrolled and
the strategies of translation used to ensure that these networks are durable. Examining
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the heterogeneous associations necessary for stable macro-stractures to exist allov/s a
new insight into the relationship between society, technology and power.
3.4 AWT; Translation, Technology & Society
It is now possible to fully examine technology within the actor-netw'ork perspective. This
will entail, first, a clear definition of the role of technology in society, and second, a
vocabulary to account for technology’s role in society.
Society is made up of sociotechnical relations and associations. In this
sociotechnical world, humans build lasting macro social structures by appealing to and
enrolling entities that are more durable than the intentions that initially led to their
construction. The idea that France should adopt electric vehicles in order to appeal to the
social demands of post-industrial consumers and help to eliminate both noise and
environmental pollution does not work in practise without the nonhuman entities enrolled
in the construction of the electric engine. We are never faced with networks that are
associations of humans or nonhumans exclusively. If this was the case you would have
purely social relations demanding a change in the culture of the automobile and nothing
else or an electric vehicle that has no place in France because humans have not been
accounted for in the demand, production, or use of the VEL (Latour 1991, p. 110).
We now have a very different conception of the role of technology in society. No
longer is technology a determining influence or a neutral tool that reflects the needs of the
user. Technology is, as Latour makes clear in the title of an article, “society made
durable” (Latour 1991). This new approach to what the social is necessitates a new
vocabulary for the role of technology. If technology’s role is as stated above, it may no
longer be useful to account for it by referring to existing descriptions predicated on a
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separation of technoiogy and society. We know how to describe human relations, we
know how to describe technology, we know how to talk about the influence of
technology on society and vice versa, but there is a lack of vocabuiajy for thinldng about
these aspects as an integrated whole. This is unfortunate, because whenever a stable
social structure is found, it is inevitable that technologies of some kind are essential to its
relative durability (Latour 1988a, p.299; Latour 1991, p.111).
Technology translates a vision of the world in the technical content of the new
object. The end product of this translation is a ‘script’ or sociotechnical ‘scenario’
(Akrich 1992, p.208). This translation is dependent on ‘pre-inscription’, all the
translations that need to be done by an actor before a scenario is played out, all the things
assimilated by an actor before being translated by the scenario (Latour 1988a, p.307).
These actions are not predictable though, and the translations that are relied upon may at
any time dissipate. The EDF developed a scenario in which their innovation, the VEL,
was to play the central role. In order for this to happen they needed to translate a vision
of the world that would be realized in the working VEL. Necessary for this is what the
scenario presupposes from its enrolled actors: the pre-inscription. It is assumed, and
necessary, that actors in the EDF network are pre-inscribed already with competencies
needed for the success of the VEL. Consumers must be pre-inscribed as upset with the
direction of the automobile; govemment must be pre-inscribed as supportive of the VEL,
and the research laboratories must be pre-inscribed as having the knowledge to
successfully enrol the technical elements in the VEL’s engine.
If these steps are performed and the technical object is realized, it in turn
translates behaviour back onto the human user. Translation then is the moral and ethical
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dimension of technology (Latour 1992, p.232). The VEL, if it was successful, would
prescribe in the user a specific morality relevant to the use of the automobile. The VEL
would prescribe to the user that he/she is mindful of environmental concerns, that he/she
is not concerned with travelling at excessive speeds, and that the user is not concerned
with relating the ownership and use of an automobile with social status. The VEL
prescribes, or translates, specific features of the user so that he/she does not know that
they want anything else. This is possible because these translations are made durable by
the successful working of both social and technical elements embodied in the VEL.
Nothing in a given scenario can prevent the inscribed actors from behaving
differently from what was expected (Latour 1992, p.237). This is clear in the example of
the VEL. Social groups can change their mind and demand better public transportation
instead of an electric vehicle; zinc/air accumulators can become contaminated and not
Mfill their inscribed role; Renault can do everything in their power to avoid being
reduced to a smaller and less powerful corporation. It is these conflicts that create a
situation in which it is necessary to follow ail of the actors in order to understand how a
specific technology can come to be stabilized and performed. To follow the actors during
the processes that lead up to the final, stable technology, is to follow the negotiations
between the innovators and the users and to study the way in which the results of these
negotiations are translated into technological form (Akrich 1992, p.208).
Technology can therefore be seen as an object that embodies two dimensions, the
social and the technical. Technology in its final form can thus be examined from both
dimensions. First, by examining it from the perspective of who it is designed to enrol,
and second, what it is tied to so as to make the enrolment inescapable. Latour (1987)
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describes this process as viewing both the ‘sociogram’ and hechnogram^ of any artefact,
any information yon have for one system is also information on the other (p.l3§). If the
VEL wwked and was used you could therefore see in the technology (the VEL) how it
translates the social (urban, post-industrial & environmentally concerned) and in the
social how it translates the technology (ecoiogically responsible, egalitarian
transportation). At no time does one aspect determine the other.
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Chapter Four - Socioteehnieal Power: The Technical Code & Translation
The previous two chapters examined how both the CTT and ANT conceive of power in
modem technological society. Addressing the critiques that Feenberg has of ANT and
showing the potential of ANT to complement the CTT will be the focus of this chapter.
Arriving at that point will require, first, a review of the underlying concept of the
‘sociotechnical’ that guides both the CTT and ANT. Following this, I will re-interpret
both the technical code and translation from a sociotechnical perspective as two
complementary insights that address the same basic concem from different perspectives.
These insights will provide a basis to re-examine and address Feenberg’s critiques of
ANT.
4.1 The Soeioteehnical
Studies of technoiogy and society often regard technology as either neutral or
deterministic. Technological neutrality is based on the idea that technologies are tools
that stand under the same norm of efficiency in each and every social context.
Technology is not pre-disposed to achieve specific ends as it contains a universal
rationalit}' that renders technology neither socially nor politically relative (Feenberg
2002, p.6). Technological determinism is best defined as the belief that technical change
is the prime mover of social change. This perspective on technology is reflected in
terminology like ‘the infonnation society’, ‘the industrial age’ or, ‘the computer age’.
What these terms have in common is the belief that technology stands behind and is the
determining factor in defining society.
Although different in their interpretation of technoiogy, both technological
neutrality and technological determinism share two commonalities in their understanding
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of technology. First, technoiog}'' is destiny. Both theories share a ‘take it or leave if
attitude toward technology and regard technological rationality as beyond the scope of
human intervention. The idea that technology is inherently disposed to reflect social
values and could, in a different society, be radically changed lies outside the parameters
that bound technological determinism and neutrality (Feenberg 2002, p.8). Second, both
separate technoiogy and society as two different categories of study. This ontological
separation exists only in abstraction and does not reflect the actual process of living in a
technological society. Anyone who lives in modem technological society knows that
what is defined as social is usually mediated to some degree by technology, and what is
defined as technology does not exist without human users.
The alternative to both technological neutrality and determinism can be found in
the concept of the ‘sociotechnical’. This concept is primarily based on two features
discovered through empirical analysis of technological innovation, design and
stabilization^^ First, neither society nor technologies exist in isolation from each other.
Society is bound together by technology as much as technology is bound together by
society. It is only in the wilder reaches of science fiction, or quite possibly on nude
beaches, that one can obsewe either a pure technological or social order (Law & Bijker
1992b, p.290). Second, if the ‘social’ order is held together by technological means, it
cannot be assumed that this order is durable and stable. What is called the social order
may at any time change or fail as technologies change or fail. Neither technology nor
social institutions move along linear paths of trajectory: their paths are variable and
contingent on a number of non-social or non-technical elements (Law & Bijker 1992b,
p.291).
For a collection o f studies that employ the concept o f the sociotechnical see Bijker & Law (1992).
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By embodying a concept of the sociotechnical in their theories, both ANT and the
CTT share a similar strategic point of departure. It is quite easy to identify the influence
of the sociotechnicai perspective in ANT. The primar}^ focus and analyticai emphasis on
the heterogeneity of the social makes it clear that the two features of the sociotechnical
mentioned above - the social is not purely social and sociotechnical orders can change are given in any ANT-influenced study. Feenberg’s CTT on the other hand is not as
explicit as ANT in its reliance on the concept of the sociotechnical. Although there are a
number of emblematic quotes in Transforming Technology that could be used to show
Feenberg’s use of the sociotechnical, the best evidence can be found in the concept of the
technical code. It is clear that Feenberg does not regard technology as being determined
by solely technological factors. The social requirements of capitalism are as much a part
of technology as the technical elements. Second, by identifying the social influence on
technology, Feenberg also identifies technology’s influence on society. This can be
found in his examination of how capitalist technology determines specific social
functions such as a capitalist division of labour. In this way, the CTT complies with the
first aspect of the sociotechnical perspective: technologies are never completely
technological, and society is never purely social. The second aspect of the sociotechnical
perspective is made much more forcefully in the CTT: technologies are predisposed to
meet different social requirements, resulting in a theory of technology that recognizes the
inherent potentiality of technology to exist in a variety of forms different than the forms
that surround us today.
Employing the concept of the sociotechnicai allows one to re-examine the C T T
and ANT from a perspective that differs from Feenberg’s critique of ANT. It is my
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contention that both theories, and more specifically their conceptions of power, provide a
complementary understanding of the sociotechnicai. If, as is implied by ^opting a
sociotechnicai perspective, sociotechnical orders can exist in many different forms, why
do we exist in a relatively stable sociotechnical order, and how is this complexity
stabilized and Hack boxed?
The first part of this question, why the sociotechnical is the way that it is, is
answered by the CTT. Our contemporary sociotechnicai order takes the form that it does
because of the influence of capital. The capitalist technical code determines the social
function of technology which reproduces and extends the power of capita! at the expense
of environmental and humanistic concerns. Technology can change, though, and
Feenberg develops the concept of technological ambivalence to identify the point at
which technology is relatively neutral concerning the role that social influences play in its
development. Without reverting to fatalism, sociotechnical regression, or the call for the
destruction of all technology, Feenberg is able to identify the negative effects of
contemporary technology, but also provides a theory of technological change that
recognizes the existing technological base for progressive change.
The CTT does not completely answer the second part of the question, how do
capitalist sociotechnical arrangements remain durable and spread over time and space?
Although Feenberg makes it clear that the process of technological innovation, and by
result technology itself, is oriented towards a given reality and not potentialities, he is
unable convincingly to provide an analytical model that can identify the technical code as
it is applied in different technologies. Using the insights of ANT, one can use a
vocabulary and analytical strategy to ‘open the black box’ of technology and potentially
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discover the point at which the technical code of capitalism is applied. This differs from
the CTT ill the sense that an ANT analysis would be premised on the understanding that
the technical code is applied at different phases of innovation depending on the
technology in question. Thus, the ambivalence of technology can also be discovered at
different points of technological innovation.
Theorizing about the potential for technological change and applying these
insights in practise is where ANT can complement the CTT. There currently exist a
number o f technologies that can already reflect positive social influences. Infomation
and communication technologies and technologies that provide the infrastructure for
modem communities are fields that contain examples of technologies that can contribute
a clear social good. There are also technologies that solely benefit the demands of
capitalism at the expense of humans and the environment: hidden consumer and public
surveillance technology^^, technologies that create unequal access to information (digital
copyright management systems)^^, and of course, nuclear weapons. These examples are
used to show that in some cases there is an evident dichotomy between the positive and
negative social influences and implications of technology, but in most cases the claim
that a technology is influenced by positive social goals is difficult to make. Is the
technical code applied to personal computing technology? At what point in its
development is it applied? This question could be asked of a number of technologies
that, like the personal computer, cannot be uniquely defined as ‘ambivalent’ or a source
of capitalist power.

See Samarajiva (1996).
See Cohen (1996).
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Discovering how these technologies are embedded with the technical code is the
complementary aspect of ANT that can assist in developing a critical theory of
technology that can be applied in practise. Because the CTT does not provide either an
analytical strategy or a vocabulaiy' that can fully account for power in the sociotechnical
world, and because ANT does not articulate a need or strategy for sociotechnical change,
both theories can complement each other by providing a reason why sociotechnical
change is needed, and the means to achieve this change.
By adopting an ANT perspective in answer to the question of how sociotechnical
orders maintain their durability over time, the CTT can be influenced by an analytical
model that better reflects sociotechnicai complexity. The theorists by whom Feenberg is
influenced, Marx and Marcuse, lack a concept of the sociotechnicai, generating problems
that Feenberg remedies by using a sociotechnicai model of analysis. ANT is based on the
premise of the sociotechnical and does not need to identify this feature in its formulations
as being significant from other theories of technology. Rather, ANT is focused on
devising an analytical strategy and terminology to account for how power is achieved and
maintained in a sociotechnical order. Translation is the core concept it employs to this
end. ANT provides a single and unified vocabulary that describes the work of creating
and imposing the social and the technical (Law 1986b, p.4). By using ANT in this way,
the CTT can acquire a tool to identify the ambivalence of technology and to map more
completely the technical code.
4.2 Translation & The Technical Code
The technical code provides a concept that examines why the sociotechnical takes the
form that it does. Any technological artefact embodies both technical elements and social
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requirements. Identical to the ANT idea that the social can be seen in the technical and
the technical in the social, the technical code can be understood as a form of translation.
The technical code translates humans that are enrolled in sociotechnical orders via
technology and translates social aspects in technoiogy by embodying a specific form of
technological rationality. These aspects can be seen in Feenberg’s example of the
technical code of capitalism as it is applied to the assembly line.
The assembly line is an excellent example of a technology influenced
by [the technical code]: a strategy of technologically enforced labour
discipline forms the glue that holds together the elements from which
it is composed. This asymmetrical effect on power is characteristic
of a strategically encoded technology (Feenberg 2002, p.78)
Technology can also be strategically encoded by a different technical code by
translating social interests and technology in a completely different configuration:
The assembly line only appears as technical progress because
it extends the kind of administrative rationality on which capitalism
already depends. It might not be perceived as an advance in the
context of an economy based on workers’ cooperatives in which
labour discipline was self-imposed rather than imposed from above.
(Feenberg 2002, p.78-9)
Technologies are tools of translation. They durably translate actors. The
contemporary assembly line translates workers as non-owners that “are indifferent to the
welfare of the firm” (Feenberg 2002, p.78). The VEL translates drivers as
environmentally responsible, unconcerned with speed and progressively post-industrial.
Feenberg recognizes this aspect of translation in the technical code. The technical code
coordinates social determinants in technologies that are evident by examining the social
and environmental effects of technological mediation. Technology, in this sense, only
refers to the end product, the punctualized actor. However, any actor is the effect of
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interaction between heterogeneous elements, and thus “punctuaiization converts an entire
network into a single point or node in another network” (Callon 1991, p.153).
Following the actors allows an examination of the way in which these actors
attempt to impose their sociotechnicai worldview on other actors, and more importantly,
howf these actors resist or accept the translations proposed. As was detailed in the
example of the VEL, every actor in the proposed sociotechnical network had to be
translated for the network to be successM. How would these translations be achieved?
By using scientific knowledge and data derived from social analysis. By encouraging the
govemment to subsidize communities who want electric-powered public transportation.
By creating a sociotechnical world in which the traditional automobile was doomed as a
relic of a previous age. The translations were to be achieved using a variety of materials
to enrol actors in the network. Identifying the processes and materials used to create
sociotechnical orders can in turn discover the point at which the technical code is applied.
The technical code is not an ‘invisible hand’ or a ‘phantom’ that guides technological
innovation. It can be found in textbooks, managerial decisions, sociotechnical scenarios
and interpretation of data. All of the translations that were combined in the construction
of the VEL were necessary and they had to exist as real interactions between actors.
Examining the assembly line in this way would reveal the processes, negotiations and
materials that were used to create an obvious example of how the capitalist teciioical code
is applied. Applying these insights to a punctualized technological artefact is no
different.
If a technology exerts power over people and the environment, this is an effect of
the heterogeneous elements that make it up. Appealing to a single source of power to
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explain domination is mistaken; identifying the interactions that create this effect
provides a more concise and realistic explanation (Latour 1986). It is not enough to say
that ‘capital’ determines the form and function of technology. What is needed is the
exact identification of how capitalism exists in the interactions that create the technical
code of capitalism. If the tecimical code is the expression of power in sociotechnical
orders, then discovering how this power expands and reproduces itself means studying
the interactions that create the effects of the tecimical code. Tracing its influence requires
examining the translations that enrol actors who would, on their own, not choose to be
enrolled.
If, as Feenberg states, technology is politics and social control pursued by other
means then the only way to advance a democratic politics of technology in an intensely
technically mediated society is to get inside the technology, to penetrate to the point
where technology and society mutually and simultaneously define one another (Latour
1988c, p.39). This is the point, in Feenberg’s terms, at which capitalists are able to
exercise operational autonomy, the point at which the technical code is applied, the point
at which technology is ambivalent towards different social systems, and therefore, this is
where analysis should focus. The democratization of a technology-intensive society is
antithetical to a world in which those who control technological development are the few
instead of the many.
Following the actors as they move, define, manipulate and enrol other actors does
not limit itself solely to humans. Technologies are actors that translate other actors.
They are also networks that are built up from heterogeneous elements. Identifying how
these elements are translated reveals in detail the point at which the technical code of
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capitalism is applied to technology. Sociotechnicai change is premised on the notion that
the technologies that we are currently gifted with ma}^ all be encoded with the technical
code of capitalism, but this encoding does not exist as a process that is identical in each
and ever}'- case. Rather, the ainbivalent nature of technology can be discovered at
different points within different technologies. This insight can only complement
Feenberg’s theory as it also recognizes the technological base already in existence that
can be used to reflect a socialist technical code.
4.3 Addressing Feenberg’s Critiques
Feenberg’s critique of ANT from a CTT perspective can be reinterpreted as a critique of
three aspects of the ANT strategy: the strategy of following the actors, generalized
symmetry, and generalized agnosticism. These aspects should not be understood as
standing against the insights of the CTT. Rather, these insights should be understood as
tools that can provide an answer to the second aspect of sociotechnical power - how
sociotechnicai arrangements are able to maintain their durability and expand over time
and space.
The first of these critiques, foliowmg the actors, can be found in Feenberg’s
assertion that ANT contains “disturbing normative implications” because it studies
technology from the ‘winners’ point of view. This can be understood as a critique of
‘following the actors’ during the process of developing technology. Remedying this
critique involves re-examining ‘foilowingthe actors’ from two similar perspectives
influenced by goals of the CTT. First, the ANT canon contains a number of studies that
focus on technologies that were unsuccessful, including the VEL detailed in Chapter
three. Not focusing on solely successful technologies, ANT can provide the CTT with a
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perspective on technological innovation that identifies the reason for nnsuccessfiii
innovation. If, for instance, a proposal for a manufacturing assembly line is introduced
that reflects the requirements of a different society and focuses on re-skilling, instead of
de-skiiling, the workers, this design would be rejected by the capitalists who control the
production facility. Using an ANT analysis can serve as an important tool for the CTT
because it would clearly identify the strategies of those who oppose this specific
technological innovation and help reveal the technical code of capitalism as a
determining force in technological innovation. In turn, this could expose the inherent
social contingency of technology, negating any assumption of technological neutrality.
By examining those networks and actors that are successful, those that are
powerful, it is possible to show that they are no different, in kind, from the rest of us.
They are not better or marked as different, just bigger. Thus, ANT provides a too! for
debunking the myth of the ‘great person’ who is treated as different from ail others. ANT
contends that it is an analytical mistake to think of the large and powerful in any different
way then you would anyone or anything else (Law 1991b, p. 12). In this way, ANT
provides a perspective that further reveals the sociotechnical and the CTT concept of the
inherent potential for technological change. Showing that technologies are solely the
result of networked entities and could exist differently in a different social context allows
for an approach that quickly refutes the concepts of those who insist on a determinist or
neutral approach to technology. Showing that the technology that we are endowed could
indeed be different systematically rejects the linear model of technological innovation
and the rationality that stands behind it.
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Second, the reason for looking at those who succeed is precisely because they
have succeeded,
They are bigger and more powerful, everything else being equal,
their modes of organising and ordering shape much more about the
heterogeneous networks of the social than do the strategies of the
unsuccessful. So if we want to understand the modem world, it does not
do to look at failures. (Law 1991b, p.13).
Does this mean that, as was stated in Chapter 1, “from Law's account of
Portuguese colonial expansion we learn a lot about the (ultimately) successful actors, but
hardly an}thing about the perspectives of the colonized inhabitants of Africa or India”
(Radder 1992, p. 162) ? Yes and No. Yes, Radder is correct: most ANT studies do not
recognize the demands of those who are oppressed in networks. But, this approach does
not seek to represent the perspective of the victims of Portuguese imperialism or any
other successful network; it only seeks to understand how, and through what materials,
this action is achieved. A simple rejection of Radder’s critique would be that regardless
of the concern for the victims of Portuguese imperialism, this event occurred. Instead of
seeking to examine what should or could have occurred, ANT seeks only to examine how
this occurred and through what means this was achieved^"^. However, providing an
examination of the tools and materials used by the Portuguese can provide an
understanding of how they were successful and how their technology was encoded to
provide specific results.

The basis of this particular case study, the Portuguese expansion into India, is explained by Law when he
writes, “Columbus’s discovery of the New World in 1492, when taken with the arrival of heavily armed
Portuguese vessels in the Indian Ocean in 1498, clearly marks an important turning point in the balance of
power between Eui'ope and the rest o f the world. From that moment onwards until the very recent past the
rest o f the world has been under European control and domination” (Law 1986a, p.234). The question he
asks is, “How was it that Christian Europe, at the turn o f the 15* century, hemmed in in the East by
predatoiy Muslim powers, succeeded so dramatically in turning the tables?” (Law 1986, p.236)
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The strategy of social domination and the need to overcome this domination is
evident in Feenberg’s account of technology. Tracing how this domination is maintained
can be accomplished by tracing the translations that it is dependent on. Simply
recognizing the demands of those who are enrolled in networks does little to examine the
exact processes by which this is achieved. Discovering these translations can lead to
resistance by identifying the materials and processes that those who control others are
dependent upon. The critical theory of technology provides a voice for those who are
oppressed in sociotechnical orders, and articulating this voice means also recognizing
how it became oppressed. In order for sociotechnical change to recognize the
ambivalence of technology and proceed with a socialist technical code it is necessary to
examine at which point in the process of design the technical code is applied. As was
stated earlier, this point may exist at different phases of the design process. Examining
successful technological innovations can only reflect the insight that some technologies
do indeed provide a clear social good while others do not. It is not desirable to simply
critique the totality of human technological innovations; instead, we must employ a
model of examination that can show why some technologies need not be significantly
transformed and why some others should be.
The second aspect of Feenberg’s critique is focused on the ANT concept of
generalized symmetry. Feenberg argues that this particular aspect of ANT is logically
incoherent. Generalized symmetry is a ‘questionable’ approach to technology because it
endows nonhumans with agency when “it is after all ‘we’ who do the distributing”
between what is human and nonhuman (Feenberg 2000, p. 153). As was explained in
Chapter 3, ANT does not disregard the influence or importance of humans, it is simply an
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analytical strategy. “The distinction between humans and machines is subordinated to
another concern - that of exploring the deveiopment of a complex sociotechnical system”
(Law 1991b, p. 10). ANT does not assume that there exists no difference between
humans and nonhumans. Rather, it charts a course for investigating the sociotechnical
that assumes that both humans and nonhumans play a significant role in the
sociotechnical dynamic by recognizing that what is generally called human contains
technical elements that help define the humanness of any social agent (Gallon & Law
1997, p. 168).
Viewing ANT as a means of understanding how power is maintained legitimates
generalized symmetry as a viable approach to sociotechnical orders. Because Feenberg
concerns himself with why these orders exist, he is unable to appreciate the potential
insights of generalized symmetry to serve as a tool within the CTT. The value of this
approach is detailed in the following example.
Re-examining Langdon Winner’s examination of technologically enforced racism
in New York, the attributes of ANT and generalized symmetry are made evident. Robert
Moses, in the language of Feenberg, embedded a racist technical code in the bridges that
he built. The dialectical concept of technological rationality in this case is clear: the
design of the bridge has the potential to provide access to all public parks, but this reality
is structurally blocked by Moses’ racist social beliefs that are expressed through this
specific technical code.
Feenberg critiques generalized symmetry because it is humans, and only humans,
who can measure the potential of technology against the reality. “Reflexivity of this sort
is essentially different from the contributions of nonhuman actors, and forms the basis for
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social straggles that may challenge or disrupt the networks and even reconfigure them in
new forms” (Feenberg 2002, p.34). Back in New York, what people thought of these
bridges mattered little as they could not rebuild them to better accommodate themselves
and the others who were affected by them. Social groups were able to resist this racist
oppression, not by building new bridges, but by being newly empowered through roads
and the cars that undid the translations that the bridge and its social effects were
predicated on. The power of this technology was transformed by material, and not social,
means (Law 1991a, p.l76).
This example highlights both the complexity of technology and the possible forms
of resistance that can be identified. Unable to challenge the bridges by direct means, the
technical code was overcome by reversing the translations that made it a powerful
network. In this specific case, resistance was achieved by appealing to a simplified actor
in the complex network embodied by the bridge. Once that actor was changed, the
network was also changed. This marks an interesting insight that ANT can lend to the
CTT. The ambivalence of technology can potentially be found in the simplified actors
that make up a sociotechnical network. Tracing the translations that lead to stable
sociotechnical orders provides a means to identify multiple forms of resistance by
identifying, and attempting to reverse, the translations that sociotechnical networks are
built up from.
Generalized symmetry is also a primary aspect of the socialist technical code
developed by Feenberg.
A socialist technical code would be oriented towards the reintegration
of the contexts and secondary qualities of both the subjects and
objects of capitalist technique. These include ecological, medical,
aesthetic, urbanistic, and work-democratic considerations that capitalist
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and communist societies encounter as “problems,” “externalities ” and
“crisis.” (Feenberg 2002, p. 184).
It appears that a socialist technical code would reintegrate all of these aspects into
a new form of technological rationality. This form of socialist technological rationality
would thus take into consideration a number of actors that are ignored under the capitalist
technical code. Environmental aspects and aesthetic concerns would not be placed
outside of technological concern, they would be as important as the technical elements
that make up the technology and the users/subjects of technology. In this way, adopting a
principle of generalized symmetry allows for a form of technological rationality that
unquestioningly accounts for all human and nonhuman actors of sociotechnical
development. Generalized symmetry represents an ontological transformation necessary
to overcome capitalist technological rationality and legitimate a socialist technical code.
The third critique that Feenberg has of ANT is focused on the concept of
generalized agnosticism. Recognizing the transcendent goals of a different social system
and technology is not something that ANT explicitly accounts for. I do not disagree, nor
seek to remedy this critique, because it is premised on Feenberg’s understanding of why
sociotechnical arrangements take the form that they do. It is not within the analytical
strategy of ANT to discover transcendent goals that could be applied to sociotechnical
arrangements. ANT seeks only to answer how these arrangements are made durable.
Understanding that this aspect of ANT is a limitation from the CTT perspective shows
only the potential of the CTT to reciprocally complement ANT in a similar way to how
ANT can potentially complement the CTT.
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4.4 Revealing the Technical Code
Both the CTT and ANT can compiement each other with their insights and analytical
strategies. Although there is a significant difference in what both seek to identify, this is
remedied by using elements of ANT to complement the insight of the CTT. Providing an
answer to why sociotechnical arrangements take the form that they do reveals the
negative social and environmental influence of capitalism. However, applying these
insights requires an analytical strategy that can account for the complexity that stands
behind sociotechnical arrangements. It is not enough, I contend, to simply state that
capitalism as a social system contains within it a specific form of rationality embodied in
its technical code that is detrimental to the interests of those who value humanist or
environmental concerns. Although this insight is essential in any formulation for radical
sociotechnical transformation, the CTT is in need of an analytical strategy that can enable
it to influence change without mistakenly accounting for the implications of such radical
change.
Revealing the technical code through the actual processes and materials used by
those who control the direction of technological design cannot only identify the actual
point at which each technology we use is encoded by capitalism, it can also be used to
identify technologies that are not encoded by capitalism. I find it difficult to comprehend
that the technical code of capitalism influences the design of manufacturing technology in
the same way that it may encode the plumbing and sewer systems found in our society.
Because of this, the goal of transforming technology needs to be aware of the
complexities that stand behind and create the technologies that exist in our modem
society.
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